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Abstract  
 
 
      This project analyses the question of ‘can the European Union (EU) continue as a global actor 
after being struck by the financial and economic crises’. The analysis is made with main focus on 
the impact on EU’s role on the international scene. The project considers the crisis through an 
analysis of the decision-making patterns of the EU, using historical, sociological and discourse-
integration theories.  Through the analysis of the three types of institutionalism and the economical 
reforms, the project will try to give an understanding of any occurring decisions and changes. This 
is suggested to be mirrored in the EU’s role globally, and is argued to provide the context for to 
what extent the EU has been influenced by the financial global crisis.  
      Through the Monetarists, Realist and Neo-liberal theories the project emphasises the 
development of the crisis and the Fiscal Compact. The economical foundation of the EU is 
evaluated to see whether it has enhanced the crisis impact. Also, the willingness of other global 
actors to support the EU financially will be analyses, using Russia, China and the USA as examples, 
as it is suggested to influence on the EU’s role as a global actor as whole. 
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1. Introductory chapter 
1.1. Problem statement 
“Can the EU continue as a Global Actor, after being struck by the Financial Crisis?“ 
1.2 Motivation  
The current economic crisis has left the European Union (EU) on a metaphorical cross-road of 
decisions. The members states’ financial situation is suggested to make the EU unstable as a whole, 
and might generate pessimism related to integration. Differently, others have suggested that the 
crisis-situation can help the member states act more in unity to combat the common threat to their 
economies, making the Union more harmonised.  
Since 2008 a string of political decisions has been made by the EU to settle the economic issues 
within the Union. Especially the Euro-zone has been impacted by new measurements for the 
economical discipline. 
These decisions are suggested to be made through the integration theories, and are believed to be 
core determinates of the political environment within the EU. It is central to the understanding of 
the crisis within the EU, and in particular to the issues related to the Euro-zone. The EU has, as an 
economic- and political actor, tried to manage the economic crisis within its member states by 
creating structural, economic and financial reform pacts.  
It is not only the economical aspect that of interest, as the crisis of the Euro-zone strikes the EU’s 
value image. This raises a serious question of what kind of political and economical models the EU 
should pursue as a whole, whilst moving away from a ‘multispeed EU’. 
The suggested ‘multi-speed’ EU adds to the argument of a Euro-zone on two levels – centre and 
periphery; the economically stable Euro-zone members with leading economies, opposite the 
periphery Euro-zone members with weak economies and a high degree of in-debt.  
Due to the level of economic integration and dependency through the globalisation process, the 
decisions made to stabilise the economy of the EU, are as much of an economical decisions, as they 
are political, as they are thought to reflect the EU’s image related to international politics. 
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Therefore, the process is considered crucial for the creation of the future path of the EU, however, 
these decisions need to be analysed in the light of the current political environment. The most 
central points to the project’s analytical approach, are based on the integration theories and the 
dilemma of Euro-monetarist economic versus Keynesian economic theory. The project is focused 
on the analysis of the mechanism for the crisis-management, and will attempt to uncover some of 
the reasons for the EU’s positioning, via theoretical analysis and compared with empirical evidence.  
Nonetheless, the complex nature of the EU makes the analysis of it, as a single actor, ambiguous. 
This is due to the vast cultural, political and economic span within. Especially the EU’s role as a 
single global actor needs to be addressed in the light of crisis management.  
The global link between economies is suggested to be promoted by a Neo-liberal agenda, which 
inspires to the euro-monetarist economic theory. This combined with the Structural- integration 
theory, creates a path-dependency which suggests the mechanisms of the EU are instigated by a 
historical link.   
Through the analysis of the three integration theories and the economical decisions of the EU, this 
project will attempt to understand if the crisis has forced the EU to change its behaviour in relation 
to its role as a global actor. In addition, the project will evaluate to what extent the crisis has had an 
impact in how the EU is perceived by the rest of the Global community.  
 
1.3 Research question 
1. How the other global actors are willing to manage EU debt crisis and the economical situation in 
EU? 
2. Can the academic integrations theories be used to create an understanding of EU’s reaction to the 
economic crisis? 
3. Can the choices made, have future consequences for the EU as a global actor? 
 
1.4 Interpretation 
Our research questions are based on the problem statement. They are showing concrete questions 
that will be relevant to ask during the whole project in order to come up with the conclusion for our 
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problem statement. The problem statement should be understood as how in the real life, the current 
debt crisis in the European Union affected its role as a global actor, maybe there have been some 
changes in the EU perception by other global actors or the crisis made the relationship with other 
countries of the world stronger. In the beginning by using first of the research questions, it is 
considered to look into the economical situation in the EU in the real time,  the development of the 
crisis and the role of other global actors in the EU debt crisis bailout. With the help of the second 
question, it is expected that integration theories could help to understand or explain the way in 
which the EU started to combat the crisis. The last part will be answered based on the analysis as a 
whole. Here, the information and analyses will be transformed into an opinion, which will evaluate 
whether the actions can have consequences for the EU as a global actor. This will lead to a 
conclusion of the EU’s relationship with the other global actors, and to what extent it has been 
damaged, or propelled to a new level of commitment. One of the important points that should be 
mentioned is, that the EU understood as used as the whole Union with Eurozone members and those 
who are outside, from the outside perspective.  
 
1.5 Scope/limitations 
Our research will include materials from 2008 (Lehman brothers crack-down) until 20th April 2012. 
This limits the opportunity to create a complete up to date account of the developments. However, 
has been necessary for the purpose of producing a sound project.  
Out project have some limitations to it, as we have chosen a more narrow analyt ical approach of the 
EU. With the focus on the EU as a global actor, it was decided to consider the EU as a single global 
actor, leaving the theoretical debate of multi-speed EU and the lack of representation aside. This 
was done through the thought-process of ‘how the EU is perceived’ by the global community. The 
internal matters and issues of the collective member states will, on global matter, become 
insignificant, as long as the EU as whole is functioning as a political institution.  
In order to see how the global actors see and willing to help the debt crisis of EU, we have chosen 
three big global players: China, Russia and the US. Our decision was based on that these countries 
are the main trade partners of the EU (Appendix 3). Another point which is relevant to mention, we 
are not looking very close to these countries economical position and relationship with the EU. We 
are looking into the debt crisis and the situation created by it, and how the three of them are acting 
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with accordance to the EU. We are also taking into consideration what are their motives, if they are 
willing to help or not.  
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2. Methodology  
2.1 Theories and models used   
There will be two main parts where theories will be used: 
Economical part: 
To start with, there will be a brief introduction of the Monetarist, Realist and Neo liberal theories. 
Then follows the part presenting the AAA rating and the consequences. It will be also presented the 
development of the crisis as well as closer look on which are ESM, IMF and the Fiscal Compact. 
Hereafter, the current situation of the EU, and its relationship with the Russia, China, and the USA 
will be analyses as of how these actors are willing to help the EU economically. In this part the euro 
bonds will be discussed as well. 
Political part:  
Firstly a short outline of the EU as political institution with a distinguishing of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
power, in relation to neo-liberalism as the dominating discourse. 
Then historical, sociological and discourse-integration theories will be applied to the current 
political environment of decision-making. 
The EU is then analysed as a single global actor in relationship to the USA, China and Russia. 
 
2.2 Data collection 
The project is based on a ‘Desk research’. The sources for the project will be established on primary 
sources from OECD, WTO, the European Commission, Eurostat, IMF and the ECB creating the 
basis for our empirical analysis. Secondary sources are the main element in the project, with journal 
articles and theory books providing the analytical debt and various perspectives on the topic. In 
order to understand the current economical situation, the newspaper articles will be used for the 
better overview of the current situation worldwide, and which opinions the project’s selected 
countries have.  
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2.3 Structure 
 
2.4 Criticism of sources  
As the empirical sources are from date-bases, there is a change of bias in the way the data-collection 
has been made. However, the data is from peer-assets political organisations, and it must be 
considered to be fulfilling the criteria for not being biased. 
The secondary sources are mainly derived from academic books, newspaper articles and journal 
articles. Thereby they are considered to be peer-assets and it is expected that they can be relied on 
for factual and sound information.  
It must, however, be considered in the light of the theoretical school the authors approach is coming 
from. The weakness of the desk-based research method is the lack of ability to clarify and control 
the facts and data provided. Hereby, it is necessary to consider the sources individually as well as 
attempt to extract the same date from two independent secondary sources, to maximise the validity 
of their claim. 
Throughout the project, the use of tertiary sources has been downplayed. The validity of such 
sources are not considered to have academic validity as such, however, can provide ‘tongue-in-
cheek’ perspectives to some of the current political and economic problems. Thereby, there will be 
some sources of tertiary-standard, but only used for commentary purpose, to as academic 
statements.  
One of the main critiques of the sources could be the fact that the crisis is still developing, and the 
full picture is yet to be unravelled. However, this has been tried safeguarded through the project 
limitations and the cut-off deadline, 20th April 2012. 
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3. Theories 
3.1 Integration theories 
The integration theories are considered as an analytical tool, to which academic scholars look when 
analysing the internal decision-making procedures of the EU. Four different theoretical approaches 
have been developed: Rational institutionalism, discursive institutionalism, Historical 
institutionalism and Sociological institutionalism. In this section, the three latter ones will be 
presented. The Rational institutionalism has been deselected due to its very narrow analytical scope.  
 
3.1.1 Discursive institutionalism 
    The new branch of the new institutionalism came across when the three others have faced the 
problem with institutions, which they defined have had propensity to be overly “sticky” and the 
agents have been mainly set in terms of preferences and norms. The turn to ideas and discourse by 
scholars represented their attempt to unstuck institutions and to loosen preferences and norms.  
It helps to investigate the role of ideas and discourse in politics while giving the more dynamic 
approach to institutional change than other branches of institutionalism. The discourse is a process 
of passing on ideas (Schmidt, 2008, p. 8). Scholars believe in the representation of idea through 
discourse, including frames, narratives, myths, stories and etc. (Roe, 1994; Hajer, 2003; Schmidt V. 
A., 2010, p. 3). They take ideas and discourse very seriously and use three other institutionalisms as 
background information. But most important thing is that they accept a more dynamic view of 
change, where ideas and discourse prevail over obstacles (Schmidt, 2008). The ‘institutionalism’ in 
discursive institutionalism suggests that this approach is not only concerning the communication of 
ideas or ‘text’ but also about the institutional framework in which and through which ideas are 
communicated via discourse (Schmidt V. A., 2010, p. 4). In the DI a lot of attention is faced to 
discourse – which is not only the idea or “text” (what is said) but also a context (where, when, how, 
why it is said). It is also important to mention who said what to whom (Schmidt V. , 2008). 
 
For DI interests are subjective ideas, which still real, are neither objective nor material. Norms are 
dynamic, having inter-subjective structure rather than static. Vivien Schmidt argues that DI is a 
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characteristic approach that contributes to the understanding of political actions is such ways, that 
other three institutionalisms cannot.  
The type of ideas could be different, that is why policies, programs, philosophies have two types, in 
DI opinion. One is a cognitive (casual ideas) – explaining what is and what to do, providing basic 
information as guidelines for political action and serve to justify policies and programs by speaking 
to their interest-based logic and necessity. Here ideas show how politicians try to solve the problem, 
which problems should be solved at first defining the methods, tracking the appropriateness of the 
overall situation in the norms and principles view. Other one is so called normative – specify what 
is good and what is bad about what is, attaching values to political actions and serve to legitimate 
the policies in a program through reference to their suitability. Normative ideas look at how 
aspirations and ideas of the public is meet by the politicians, how policies or programs correlate 
with the norms and principals of the public living (Schmidt V. , 2008). 
 
The discourse is also an important part of the DI, due to that the discursive processes assist to 
understand and make clear why certain ideas succeeded and other failed because of the ways in 
which they were obtainable, where and by whom. Discourse itself is not only about what you say, 
there are much more important issues like to whom you say it or where. All the little nuances 
matter.  
 
There are two forms of discourse: the coordinative discourse and the communicative discourse. The 
first one is among policy actors, which create, discuss, justify the policy ideas, at some point they 
are more static, but with the help of the “entrepreneurs” it can be more open to the change, while 
last one is between political actors and the public. This group is involved in presenting, 
legitimating, deliberating of political ideas to the public. The involvement of diverse actors is very 
high in this type of discourse.  
 
DI shares the importance of the institutions with three other branches of institutionalism, but it has 
different definition of institutions, its objects and logics of explanation and how it deals with the 
change (Schmidt V. A., 2010, p. 5). Scholars see the DI as having a big potential for providing 
insights into the dynamics of institutional change by explaining the real preferences, strategies, and 
normative orientations of actors. Institutions are treated as a given thing, as a background with 
which agents act, and as contingent which is a result of their words and actions. So it seems like 
13 
 
agents create and maintain institutions by using their background ideational abilities. The agents of 
DI use their communication capability to think, act, and speak outside their institutions even if they 
are inside. This leads to the acceptance of the ideas of change more easily. And they do not deny the 
existence of material reality; they just do not like the idea of transformation of material reality into 
material interests.  
 
At some point, DI is a mix of the other three other branches; it uses their background information, 
and improves more on ideas and discourse, in order to look more deeply in the institutional changes. 
There are no stable limitations due to the reason that all agents are using discourses in their life, in 
communicating with public.  
 
3.1.2  Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism is a social science method with an analytical approach, based on case-
studies of institutions social, economical and political behaviour across time.  It is a comparative 
and descriptive method (Pollack, 2010, pp. 22-23). It is argued to constitute an important 
counterpoint to functional theories of institution-building, as they argue against the institutions 
funders expected effect and instead consider the corresponding effect (Schimmelfennig & 
Rittberger, 2010, pp. 85-86). 
Historical institutionalism is not a unified intellectual enterprise, but can be subdivided into two 
camps. Some scholars relies on the notion of ‘rational choice’ theories, and are oriented towards 
treating history as the outcome of rational and purposeful behaviour based on the idea of 
equilibrium. They rely heavily on quantitative approaches (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, p. 8). 
Others, more qualitative oriented scholars, reject the idea of rationality and instead emphasize the 
idea that randomness and accidents matter in political and social outcomes (Pollack, 2010, pp. 22-
23). However, Historical Institutionalism is argued to be distinctively different from the Rational 
Choice Institutionalism (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, p. 6). 
Historical Institutionalism considers political institutions as providing an environment or cultural 
context which alters the individuals’ sense of ‘best interest’, through the accumulations of rules and 
procedures over time (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, p. 6). 
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The Historical Institutionalism theory was developed during the 1970s and relies heavily on the 
notion of path-dependency, with particular focus on how the actors which established the 
institutions are constrained or changed over time (Hall, 1986; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992  cited by 
Pollack, 2010, p.22). However, Paul Pierson’s (2000 cited by Pollack, 2010, p.22) described this 
phenomenon in the same way as economist calls ‘increasing returns’, whereby incentives are 
created within the institution that makes the actors stay at part of it. 
The actors are in historical institutionalism, considered to experience a ‘look in’ or inertia, where 
intuitions remains, even when the political circumstances changes (Pollack, 2010, p. 23)Here timing 
and sequence becomes important, as the level of path-dependency, the early-made decisions shapes 
future events. The path-dependency aspect is particular related to policy-making and legal 
procedures. It is argued, that the insight to this area have increasingly been added to the 
development of the European Union, especially related to the integration processes and policies 
(Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998 cited by Pollack, 2010, p.23). For historical institutionalism, the 
actors are both determined by and producers of history. 
Historical institutionalism doubts the far-sighted ability of the political actors, and their ability to 
see long term consequences of actions (Schimmelfennig & Rittberger, 2010, p. 86). This is due to 
the recognition of more complex social-interaction between the actors, especially related to large 
groups of decision-makers, like in the case of the European Union’s institutions.  
The ability to change when the institution is created is also considered marginal, aging referring to 
the path dependency, or ‘joint decision traps’ (Scharpf, 1998 quoted by Schimmelfennig & 
Rittberger, 2010, p. 86). This is suggested to be through the initiate creation of institutions, as the 
funders creates a system which are difficult to overturn, in order to secure its existence (examples 
are supermajority, veto and unanimity decision rules) (Schimmelfennig & Rittberger, 2010, pp. 85-
86). 
The lack of change for actors committed to an institution, is in Historical Institutionalism, also 
argued to be due to a cost-benefit calculation. When part-taking in a dysfunctional institution, the 
cost of leaving may have a higher price, than the price of staying. Only through ‘exogenous shock’ 
does institutional change become likely (Schimmelfennig & Rittberger, 2010, p. 86). It is important 
to notice, that even if a change within the institution may occur, the actors are considered to remain 
unchanged in their fundamental preferences and identities (Pollack, 2010, p. 23).  
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There are however, limits to the Historical institutionalisms theoretical approach. Adrian Kay 
argues for the overuse of path dependency as an explanatory factor within political institutions 
(Kay, 2005). It is likewise suggested that Historical Institutionalism could be confusing correlation 
with causality when analysing political behaviour in large perspectives. 
Historical institutionalism does also lack in the explanation of norms and informal behaviour. It 
only considers the written rules and policies when analysing a political institution (Kay, 2005, p. 
555). This Kay considers the main fault of the path dependency theory, as the policies and written 
rules are ‘expressions of a general set of objectives or desired state affairs’, and considers these to 
be choices made by the state, the government or the institution (Kay, 2005, p. 556)He continues to 
argue that the choices made may be restricted or constrained by previous created rules, but they 
remain choices, and is claimed to be influenced by routine and informal behaviour.  
Raadschelders is quoted for this criticism of path dependency’s explanatory power:  
‘It is only by virtue of retrospect that we are aware of stages or paths of development. ‘Path 
dependency’ refers to a string of related events: causality in retrospect. The concept does not even 
come close to pinpointing a mechanism or mechanisms that propel social change’ (1998, quoted by 
Kay, 2005, p.561). 
 
3.1.3 Sociological institutionalism 
The sociological institutionalism is a recent type of institutionalist theory, which has developed due 
to the sociologists’ interest in the competence of culture and organizational practices within 
institutions to shape the preferences, interests and identities of actors in the social world (Lynggard , 
2006, p. 114). 
Sociological intistutionalists scholars uses this theory through analyses of speeches, declarations, 
official documents, concentrating more on the on social agents who take actions according to the 
‘logic of appropriateness’ within political institutions (Schmidt V. A., 2010, p. 13;20). 
 
SI scholars is said to have devoted special attention to the enlargement process, looking closer at the 
negotiation and bargaining processes between the European Union and the candidate countries and 
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its occasional enthusiasm to compromise, in order to inspect the driving forces behind the entire 
process (Pollack M. , 2009, p. 138).  
SI theory is more relevant to explain the continuity than change, where institutions serve primarily 
as constrains (Schmidt V. A., 2010, p. 2). For that reason their definitions of institutions, which they 
present largely as given, is static and constraining. Nonetheless, scholars of all three institutionalist 
theories have primarily explained change as coming from the outside, as the result of exogenous 
shocks. 
The main aspects for SI are cultural rules and collective importance. But one should consider that 
institutions are understood as values and behaviour which were set collectively, and which do not 
consider crucially individual desires or habits (Aivazova, Panov, Patrushev, & Khlopin, 2005). In 
other words, people create rules, regulations, affecting the development of a social institution, and 
after that the same standards begin to affect us or our children, existing independently of our will, 
and we must comply with these institutions.  
A set of norms reach a tipping point where social norm becomes a policy goal, normally through 
articulation, common rhetorical action. Focusing on the forms and procedures of organizational life 
deriving from culturally specific practices, with institutions cast as the norms, cognitive frames, 
scripts, and meaning systems that guide human action according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
(Schmidt V. A., 2010, p. 13; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; March & Olsen, 1989; Scott, 1995).  
SI defines institutions more broadly, including informal norms and conventions as well as formal 
rules, emphasizing the competences of actors to socialize and thereby influence on the interests and 
identities (Pollack M. , 2009). Scholars of the SI argue that institutions compose actors, shaping the 
way in which these actors view the world. It accounts that often people act according to the before 
mentioned ‘logic of appropriateness’, taking signals from their institutional surroundings, 
constructing their preferences and select the appropriate behaviour for a given institutional 
environment (Pollack M. , 2009, p. 127). At some point institutions are creating frames of meaning, 
guiding human actions. Now the focus is on the behaviour of an individual who decides on his own, 
in which team to be. 
Taylor and Hall point as a limit of the sociological institutionalists the new institutionalism in 
sociology (Hall & Taylor, 1996). They suggest, that many of the institutional forms and processes 
and procedures used by the modern organizations were not adopted simply because they were most 
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efficient to the tasks but also hand in line with some transcendent “rationality’ (Pollack M. , 2009, 
p. 948).  
Taylor and Hall (1996) assume the idea that “many of these forms should be seen as culturally 
specific practices preformed through history to the society and enhanced by the formal means-ends 
efficiency but as a result of the kind of processes associated with the transmission of cultural 
practice more generally” (Pollack M. , 2009, p. 948) this vision is used to be argued about the 
similarities on international level when for example it comes to international companies or 
similarities into the educational systems into the different states (Pollack M. , 2009, p. 948).  
Taylor and Hall highlight areas relating to the sociological institutionalism in the context of the new 
institutionalism (Pollack M. , 2009, p. 948; Hall & Taylor, 1996).  First one, is their reference to the 
institutions of “formal procedures and norms”. That breaks the ‘conceptual device between 
“culture’ and “Institutions”.  Hereby, SI challenges the distinction between institutions and their 
representation through culture but also the notion of culture itself as a sociological norm.  
Differently, Amenta and Ramsey emphasizes how the SI situates on macro-political level and argue 
that the process of formation of states, political systems, and political party systems strongly 
influence political processes and outcomes (Pollack M. , 2009, p. 948).  Likewise, Cohen and 
Powell that critiques the theory for ‘the linkage between observed reality, political instruments, and 
policy goals may render impracticable a well-informed pursuit of interests’(Pollack M. , 2009, p. 
948) as well as point to the interest-driven theories may prematurely dismiss the constitutive role of 
culture in politics or conceptualize culture as being an artefact of political structures or economic 
relations (Amenta & Ramsey, 2010, p. 18; Hall & Taylor, 1996).  
 
3.2 Macroeconomic theories 
In order to understand how the European Union is thinking when making economical decisions, it is 
relevant to look into two schools of macroeconomics: Euro-monetarism (Neoclassical) and Realist 
(Keynesian) (Jespersen, 2005).  
3.2.1 Euro-monetarism is based on the very simplistic demand and supply diagram, well known 
from neoclassical microeconomics, saying that production creates its own demand. They consider 
the economical person as a person who wants to maximize revenue and minimize the costs. Profit 
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maximizing is more for the companies, where utility maximizing is consumer behaviour (Jespersen, 
2005). For EM economy is about getting the best from limited amount of money\resources through 
perfect competition.  
Capital + labour + technology         production         final demand         full employment.   
It is presented as the “perfect world”, where if the market prices are fully flexible, the model will be 
adjusted by itself, generating the general equilibrium. In their opinion, any macroeconomic 
deviation from general equilibrium is cause by either lack of price\wage flexibility or policy 
encroachment. If the wages are not flexible, there is a need to lower the wages or income tax, 
thinking that in such case the supply will increase and the unemployment decrease. In their world 
the outcome could be risky but never uncertain (Jespersen, 2005).  
3.2.2  Realist bases their knowledge on the real world and what is happening around regarding to 
macro economical imbalance. They are not supporting the ideas of “perfect world” which is self-
adjusted. The major driving force is an effective demand in their point of view.  
For example, if looking into entrepreneurs who have their expectations of the future sales, if they 
want to produce, they need to know the real expectation of sales\demand of good\services:  
Effective demand         production          employment.  
But at the same time there could not be done real calculations about the future due to the 
uncertainty. The main point for realist is that decisions should be based on the real life situation, 
where many things are unknown (Jespersen, 2005). 
In the EU euro-monetarism is the main framework for the politicians, which is assumed by 
politicians to be the best fitting one. On the other hand, realist framework needs more individual 
opinion about the situation and individual approach to solving problems, which could be not given 
to politicians by the average people.  
3.2.3 Neo liberal theory is a modern economical theory which stands for the free trade, privatization 
and self-regulating market with a minimum government intervention. The government by this 
theory has a purpose of protection individuals, liberty and strong private property rights  (Thorsen & 
Lie , 2009) 
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The main belief of the Neoliberals is that the free market mechanism is the best way of creating 
goods and services exchange process. As well as, they think that such free flow could create the 
spirit of the entrepreneur in the individuals, leading to individual freedom and welfare as well as 
giving more efficient distribution of resources (Thorsen & Lie , 2009). The idea that everybody 
should be an entrepreneur is definitely neoliberal (Treanor, 2005). 
By their ideology the national policies should affect directly only the wellbeing of the nation, but 
not the market. Neoliberal is a philosophy the market processes and structure is seen as an ethnic in 
itself, able to become as a guide for all human performance, replacing the all preceding existing 
ethical beliefs (Treanor, 2005).  
 
4. AAA-rating  
There are specific bonds ratings which indicate their credit quality. They can be high and low, 
defined with AAA (as a high one) and C as the lowest one. The highest possible rating assigned to 
the bonds of an issuer by credit rating agencies – so called AAA rating. If an issuer gets this rating, 
it means that he has high creditworthiness and can easily pay everything back. Also such bonds are 
seen to have low risk of default, offering investors the lowest yields among bonds of similar 
development (investopedia, 2012) 
During the economical instability, some of the MS of the EU lost their AAA ratings. The Standard 
& Poor's Ratings Services in December 2011 placed 15 of 17 euro-zone countries on the watch of 
possible downgrades, and in January 2012 they lowered the debt rating of nine (France, Austria, 
Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus) (in the table) of them feeling that EU 
zone MS cannot make adequate actions. Such circumstances renewed global worries over EU 
capability to bail out of financial crisis. Concerns emerged due to the reason that France – Euro 
zones second largest economy, lost its ratings. At this point, those MS who were facing crisis more 
seriously, were hoping to get help from those MS which are more stable.  However, due to the 
down-grading, it will be harder and more expensive for a bailout fund (BBC, 2012; Gaurhier-Villars 
& Forelles, 2012). 
There are less and less paymasters on whom poor MS could rely. S&P as well gave a negative 
outlook for the currency zone, representing that there is a chance of a further drop in the next two 
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years, arguing that Europeans may become tired of austerity and change. Other rating agencies like 
Fitch Ratings and Moody's Investors Service kept the AAA rating for the France, even it had a 
negative outlook but added the UK too. It is foreseen to be a struggle for France to get back its 
AAA rating, because it not so easy to get it back (BBC, 2012; Gaurhier-Villars & Forelles, 2012).  
Decision of S&P to downgrade the triple A rating of the France means that the European Financial 
Stability Facility could lost its triple A rating, meaning it needs to borrow cheaply and lend to ailing 
euro zone governments, as well as starts to be less attractive for other global actors. As France is the 
second-biggest supplier to the fund's guarantees, the probability are greater that the EFSF's ability 
will be crimped or its borrowing costs will rise (BBC, 2012; Gaurhier-Villars & Forelles, 2012). 
From the ECB chief Mario Draghi point of view, the agencies are just exaggerating the importance 
of ratings agencies, saying markets had priced in the action (Gobet, 2012). S&P also lowered the 
rating of the EFSF fund down by AA+, convincing that it is easy to get AAA if there will additional 
guarantees added. By Draghi suggestion, the other MS with AAA ratings should put more money in 
the EFSF in order for the fund to have the same power. He also mentioned that fiscal policy should 
be implemented very fast by the EU, because “decisions without matching actions are not enough," 
cautioned the ECB president (Gobet, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
21 
 
Table A: 
 
 
Source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204542404577158561838264378.html 
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Table B: 
 
 Source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204542404577158561838264378.html  
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5. Analyses  
5.1 Economical part 
This section will contextualise the crisis from an economical point of view, based on the theories 
presented in the previous chapters. It is necessary to understand the complexity of the economical 
systems, in order to grasp the impact of the economic crisis on the European Union. 
5.1.1 Financial Crisis  
The world has been preparing for a crisis long before the meltdown of the financial markets in 
September 2008. How some specialists claim the crisis is deeply rooted in major transformations in 
the global economy and financial architecture which unfolded in several stages since the early 
1980s. The September-October financial meltdown was the outcome of a process of financial 
deregulation and macroeconomic reform (Chossudovsky & Marchall, 2010, p. 3). 
The world has previously experienced economic crisis, which has led the foundation of the 
economic system the way we know it today. Recently a new economic crisis has begun, and is 
argued to start with the American Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy (a financial service company), 
leading to a clash of the world’s capitalist economy. This event is perceived as the one that put the 
final crack into the American financial system and the melt down of the financial markets in 
September 2008 (Chossudovsky & Marchall, 2010, p. 3). However, there are multiple economic 
factors that triggered the American crisis to turn into a Global crisis; this will be discussed further in 
the following sections.  
The first phase of the crisis started with the mortgage crisis that has been cost because of the 
American government that tried to get more money into the system by creating a bubble with a 
cheap landing of house credits. The consequence was a new bubble and when this bubble burst the 
meltdowns was faced. The bubble became bigger through painful correction. The Federal Reserve 
put higher level of interests and the bond of the companies with lower quality were going down. In 
that moment the hedge fund was created and that helped the Wall Street machine to keep on going 
through a creation of new bonds for millions of dollars that were secured with house mortgages. 
The hedge fund Magnetar has high profits during the burst. The scheme works as the fond buys the 
most risky bonds-collateralized debt obligations. Whenever their investments collapse the fund wins 
a lot of money. A lot of American banks help the scheme. This was not the only one hedge fund like 
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that. One of the other hedge funds is the Goldman Sachs one. Magnetar creates even bigger CDOs 
through investments than Sachs (Eisinger & Bernstein, 2010).   
The stock markets instability spreads from Wall Street into Europe and the Asian stock markets and 
this is pointed by some authors as the point where the entire financial system was affected 
(Chossudovsky & Marchall, 2010, p. 1). 
Another issue that had been emphasized from different scholars is the centralization of the bank 
power. After the financial meltdown in 2008 that was a great opportunity for the largest banks to get 
the control over weaker financial institutions. The meltdown will be conductive to the demise of 
numerous banking and financial institutions, which will either be driven out of the financial 
landscape altogether or acquired by the financial giants. (Chossudovsky & Marchall, 2010, p. 11). 
The idea here is that the clash in the system emerged financial institutions that have been created 
into the system as a consequence of the merge between different financial giants.   
When it comes to the European Union it could be suggested to be emphasized that the crisis is not 
only an Eurozone one and it is rather better to be talked about an EU economic crisis than Eurozone 
one. There are some positions of different articles and scholars that suggest the idea that the crisis 
affected mainly the Euro, but there are still not enough very convincing evidences for that.  These 
fears are also wide-spread in Brussels. The Euro has been seen as the key image of the EU. The 
European Union According to the same source, institutions tried to create mechanisms with which 
to safe the Euro. The main mechanism for political and financial reform it is suggested to be the 
Fiscal Pact.  
From neo-classical point of view the adoption of fiscal rules into the domestic policy distortions 
provided by market mechanisms problems both could be exacerbated by the move to monetary 
union. The Maastricht negotiations calls for the establishment of a “government economique” at 
the European level to promote macroeconomic policy coordination and to act as a counter-weight 
to single monetary policy (Pisany-Ferry 2006) A standard Keynesian open economy framework can 
be used to assess these questions with respect to concerns over macroeconomic stabilization. 
(Quinlan, 2007, p. 289). It is suggested that those changes were made through the creation of the 
Fiscal Pact. It is claimed that its main purpose is stronger budget rules. According to some sources, 
it is avoided the changing of the EU Treaty, but the Pact was the only one solution that could be 
found, but the hardest part is its ratification.  
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That what the Pact suggests is sanctions for the member-states that has high deficit, except if ¾ of 
the states decide that this sanctions are unnecessary. In the countries where the Pact is ratified the 
national budgets should be balanced and the European Court will be the institution that will control 
that. Another clause of it is that the European stabilizing mechanisms will become active from the 
middle of 2012. IMF will continue to function parallel with the new mechanism till the mid of 
2013.  With the rejection of the idea of changing of the EU PACT the politics sticks to the idea of 
“Europe on two gears”. Till the moment only Britain and Check republic did not ratified yet the 
Pact. Germany will ratify it till the end of the year.  According to Herman Van Rompuy the Fiscal 
pact has deep influence on the politics and will help for the solution for the debt crisis. The 
countries that do not ratify the Pact will not have access to saving funds after the spring of 2013 
(Fourier, 2012). 
In that connection when it comes to the aspects of the crisis some scholars suggest that it could be a 
consequence from regulations on the financial markets. It is claimed that one of the problems is the 
belief that the financial institutions could operate with thinner capital (Eichengreen, 2010). Another 
suggestion is that it was accepted that the capital could be guided on the basis of banks’ 
international models and ratings of securities provided by commercial credit rating agencies. The 
result suggested by some scientists is that the regulations neglected liquidity; the banks were 
allowed to hide risks in investments and to blur their balance sheets (Eichengreen, 2010). 
It is also argued that another factor was the international competition and in the case of Europe it is 
very good exemplified with that the single market politics let to the increasing of the cross-border 
competition.  As a way out of the crisis it is suggested that there should be implemented better 
cross-border politics and institutional control as well as better monetary politics and there is a need 
of a change on higher level and the start should  be looking into the Maastricht Treaty  and that the 
mechanism pointed by the Fiscal Pact are not strong enough to find a solution of the crisis but are 
strong enough for temporary mechanisms to balance temporary the economic into situation of crisis 
(Eichengreen, 2010). 
 
5.1.2 International Monetary Fund (IMF): 
According to the official IMF’s website definition, it is an international fund that works for 
international monetary cooperation and to secure the financial stability, facilitate international trade, 
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promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world. 
It is governed by 188 countries.   
The IMF’s responsibilities are to ensure the stability of the international monetary system. 
According to the official IMF’s website the system is essential for promoting sustainable economic 
growth, increasing living standards, and reducing poverty and reduces potential spillovers and 
risks through policy advice (IMF, 2012) 
The IMF’s program for Financial Assistance provides member countries the breathing room they 
need to correct balance of payments problems. It is a policy program supported by the IMF that 
guides how the financing is designed by the national authorities in close cooperation with the IMF. 
The financial support is conditioned on effective implementation of this program (IMF, 2012).  
The measurements were strengthened in April 2009, followed by further reforms in August and 
November 2011. These reforms were made to “provide flexible crisis prevention tools to a broad 
range of members with sound fundamentals, policies, and institutional policy frameworks” (IMF, 
2012).  
According to the same source “A member country may request IMF financial assistance if it has a 
balance of payments need (actual or potential)—that is, if it cannot find sufficient financing on 
affordable terms to meet its net international payments while maintaining adequate reserve buffers 
going forward. An IMF loan provides a cushion that eases the adjustment policies and reforms that 
a country must make to correct its balance of payments problem and restore conditions for strong 
economic growth” (IMF, 2012). 
 
The loan from IMF to a country is provided through implementation of appropriate policies and 
measures in particular country and to resolve its balance of payments problem. It is in IMF’s 
politics that if a country is in severe financial trouble, unable to pay its international bills, poses 
potential problems for the stability of the international financial system. According to IMF’s 
regulations any member country can turn to the IMF for financing if it has a balance of payments 
need or in other words, if it cannot find sufficient financing on affordable terms in the capital 
markets to make its international payments and maintain a safe level of reserves (IMF, 2012). 
During the crisis the lending from IMF increased. 
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At the same time, the global financial crisis has highlighted the need for effective global financial 
safety nets to help countries cope with adverse shocks. A key objective of recent lending reforms has 
therefore been to complement the traditional crisis resolution role of the IMF with more effective 
tools for crisis prevention. The IMF is not a development bank and, unlike the World Bank and 
other development agencies, it does not finance project (IMF, 2012).  
According to Michael Chossudovsky in his book The Globalization of Poverty it is underlined that 
behind the many reasons for the crisis could be suggested that the national economies are chained 
between the commercial banking and the business ownership, but the present crisis is far more 
complicated because of “its social consequences and geo-political implications (Chossudovsky, 
1997, p. 15). 
According to the author here it is exposed the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank and the WTO. He suggests that they are “administrative structures, regulatory bodies 
operating within a capitalist system and responding to dominant economic and financial interests” 
(Chossudovsky, 1997, p. 16). Chossudovsky suggests that those international organizations control 
the national economies through manipulation of market forces (Chossudovsky, 1997, p. 16). 
 
5.1.3 European Stability Mechanism (ESM)   
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM)  due to be launched as soon as Member States 
representing 90% of the capital commitments have ratified it, which is expected in July 2012 
(Europa, 2010). 
After the European sovereign debt crisis and the bailout of the EU states the reform that was 
implemented concerning the functioning of the Eurozone in a period of a  crisis let to the creation of 
the bailout mechanism by the IMF called European Financial Stability Facility (EFSE) and the 
European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM). These are only temporary measures provided till 
2013.   In March 2011 ESM are accepted as mechanism that plays central role in the anti-crisis 
mechanisms (Fourier, 2012).  
According to this treaty, the European Stability Mechanism will be an intergovernmental 
organization under public international law and will be located in Luxembourg. It would be open to 
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other members to join and would be led by a Board of Governors (Europa, 2010). Each state would 
appoint a governor and the board would either be chaired by the President of the Euro Group or by 
a separate elected chair from amongst the governors themselves.  
The main features will be built on the existing European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). Its 
purpose is to reinforce economic surveillance in the EU. The new framework includes stronger 
focus on the debt sustainability and more effective enforcement measures, focuses on prevention 
and will substantially reduce the probability of a crisis emerging in the future (Europa, 2010). 
The ESM will become operational as of mid-2013 following the expiry of the existing EFSF 
(Europa, 2010). 
The ESM will be able to provide assistance to euro area Member States in financial distress. 
Assistance will be conditional on the implementation of a strict economic and fiscal adjustment 
program, in line with existing arrangements. Private sector involvement will be decided on a case-
by-case basis, fully in line with IMF usual practices (Europa, 2010). There will be no automatic 
solutions and no prior requirement. The exact form of the participation by private creditors will 
depend on the specific nature of the problem to be addressed and will be fully consistent with IMF 
practices. A distinction will be made between liquidity and solvency crises. This will be based on a 
debt sustainability analysis (DSA) conducted by the European Commission and the IMF, in liaison 
with the ECB. In case of a liquidity problem, ESM support will be provided conditional to an 
adjustment program and private creditors will be encouraged to maintain their exposure, in line with 
the current EU and IMF practice (Europa, 2010; Fourier, 2012).  
 
5.1.4 European Union now and the Global situation 
European Union is struggling with problems concerning economy at the moment. The most fragile 
areas are PIIGS –Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. By buying their bonds, ECB is trying to 
push down the profitability on their bonds and easing the debt crisis (Schuman, 2011). But there is 
no possibility of transferring all problems on the ECB. The European Central Bank holds interest 
rates at 1,0% and does not want to do more to fight the euro zone crisis, putting the responsibility 
on the governments to cultivate growth and head off anger over strictness policies. Recently the 
ECB has already given over 1 trillion Euros to the financial system in order to smoothen debt output 
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for the EU members. Some of the member states do not think that it is a good idea to use the ECB 
as the lifebuoy from the crisis, due to the need for the countries to organize their finances by 
themselves rather than waiting for the ECB to help (Day & Jones, 2012).  
The prognoses of the economist are that EU does not have enough cash to fight with the debt crisis, 
and they assume that there will be no change in the near term. They also argue that there is a need to 
have big fundamental political and economic changes in order to determine this debt crisis. And the 
willingness of doing so should not be seen only from the one or two member states, but from the 
whole Union (Schuman, 2011).   
Other important issue is that the whole world is cooperating with each other, and if there are so 
many difficulties inside the Union, will it be seen differently by the other global actors.  The EU -
27 is accounted as 19% of global trade and is one of the largest sources of foreign direct 
investments  (Dür & Elsig, 2009)The EU currency the Euro started to be one of the important 
currencies in the worlds together with dollar (Commission, 2012).  
The Union has strong ties with US, China, Japan with their regular meeting at G7/G8/G20, the 
IMF, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as well as individual 
cooperation with each other.  
While the USA and the Europe are facing crisis, China, India and Brazil are becoming global actors 
and are achieving relative strength but anyway they are facing a lot of problems such as poverty, 
weak infrastructure, imbalanced distribution of income and wealth prevails which creates 
substantial social problems. BRICS, IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) show a low level of 
institutionalisation and a large gap between rhetoric and reality. On one hand China, India, Brazil 
become more reliable in some fields (world trade, environment, poverty) but still they have a lot of 
gaps in other areas (terrorism, democracy, etc.) (Kappel, 2011).  
The crisis in EU and US has also influenced some of other countries, for example, China, where 
many factories were closed, but from another point some of companies started to outsource to 
countries with cheap labour costs, increasing this country overall employment and income. As 
viewed from the side, US and EU are having problems meanwhile China and others obtain positive 
processes, from economical point of view if somewhere is a loss (EU, US) there is a surplus (Asia) 
on another side (appendix 2). The export of Asia is bigger comparing to EU and US, one of the 
reasons that labour cost is low which makes total cost cheaper to produce in Asia than in Europe.  
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Many countries no longer want to be followers of the West, trying to lead themselves, focusing only 
on their own interests without willing to compromise. Such situation occurred due to the reason that 
the West is not solving a sufficient amount of global problems. Europe is making a lot of promises, 
but the discursiveness of its foreign policy and security policy weaken its capacity to act decisively. 
Robert Kappel (2011) argues in his analyses that Europe lacks the dynamism, which lead to a loss 
of economic significance and it is not so prepared for the future.  
The idea of Europe was to become the most competitive and knowledge-based economy in the 
world (Suhrcke, McKee, Arce, Tsolova, & Mortensen, 2005). Kappel justifies this by saying that 
the implementation of this plan has failed due to single-minded actions of some nations, a lack of 
implementation mechanisms and incoherent strategies. It also has weak power areas such as 
military (hard power) and foreign policy. But his main argument was that the EU is more 
concentrated on itself (Kappel, 2011).  
The EU is more interested in the integration process together with the overall stability in the EU, 
but such actions make it less attractive as a global actor, which cannot coup with “non-European 
perspective” problems (Kappel, 2011). It is seen as an actor who is interested only in its own 
problems, becoming more and more problematic. In another words “less time for foreign policy” – 
the Union is so busy with their own problems about saving the Euro, the crisis, unemployment and 
debt, that there is no time to think a lot about what is happening in the world around because in any 
case there are others that could help. From economical point of view, foreign policies are also 
expensive thing to do.  
As the EU is lacking the hard power, it had set a lot of effort on it economic power, making 
financial aid as a main point of their foreign policy tool. Nowadays there are more and more 
countries which can be useful in the same area, and with economic crisis, the Union might face the 
need to cut on foreign policy funding – “less money”. This entire situation could harm the overall 
role of the EU as a global actor (Popescu, 2011). Considering all this facts, one can catch the 
moment of the fact that the EU could become as beggar, who cannot handle the crisis by its own 
resources and needs financial help from its partners in the world. This can create negative 
appearance of the EU.  Looking from another side, if the union will be able to handle crisis on its 
own, not depending on others and will be open to more significant changes, and manage the Euro 
zone situation, it will gain more positive feedback as a reliable global actor.  
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5.1.5 Eurobonds or Stability Bonds 
“A bond issued in a currency other than the currency of the country or market in which it is issued” 
(investopedia, Eurobond, 2012). Such bonds are smart financing tools due to the reason that they 
give issuers ability to decide on in which country to propose their bonds according to the country's 
regulatory constraints. Eurobond could be also denominated in their chosen currency. Investors are 
interested in Eurobond due to their small par value and high liquidity (investopedia, Eurobond, 
2012). To be precise, Eurobond is a debt agreement, which considers the borrower’s duty to pay 
interest at a given rate and the main sum of the bond on precise dates. It is mentioned also, that 
Eurobonds are free from taxes and government regulations. Now it is considered as a way to solve 
the European debt crisis. (Eurobonds, 2012).  
There was a survey conducted by the UK-based CFA Institute up to January 4, which was 
undertaken due to the European Commission possibility of issuing sovereign bonds among 
Eurozone MS. Stability bonds are seen as a potential influential tool to solve the liquidity constrains 
and support the financial stability in the Euro-zone. 52% of respondents approved the Commission 
decision that the debt crisis is needed in the common issuance of sovereign bonds among Euro-zone 
MS. While 40% did not support this idea. From all other questions asked, it could be seen that in 
overall it is a good idea, which will softer the crisis (Allen, 2012). By issuance the Eurobonds, it 
will be required to combine all Euro-zone sovereign bonds, causing that each country will be 
responsible for its own and other member of Eurozone debts (Bloomberg, A Tighter Union and 
Stability Bonds Could Save the Euro: View, 2011 A). In the real life, the euro zone MS will sell 
their bonds to investors, creating more trust by the whole group. Those money which will come 
from these bonds, will be divided among all euro members to cover up the borrowing needs, but of 
course they should be agreed in the group in order to proceed. Economists say that euro bonds are 
more attractive for the investors than the split European bonds, because borrowing could generate 
high liquidity bond market of more than €8 trillion ($11 trillion), second in size only to the market 
for U.S. government debt. Eurobonds will have interest rate that will stay somewhere between low 
German borrowing costs and high Spain and Italian yields. At some point it is beneficial for the 
Spain and Italy, but bad for Germany (Walker, 2011). 
One of the future investor could be China, which is willing to buy Eurobonds in order to help EU to 
solve the debt crisis, due to the reason that if there will be bigger problem in the EU economy, it 
could hard China also. Guo Shuqing, chairman of China Construction Bank Corp. and former head 
32 
 
of the nation’s foreign exchange regulator, stated that it is not just a free aid for the EU but also 
thoughtful move to benefit, by helping China expand its foreign-exchange reserves, to use reserves 
to protect important products or acquire resources assets overseas (Bloomberg, 2011 B).   
 
5.1.6 Attitude of the Global Actors 
The crisis period and the imbalances in the world economy could change the attitude of global 
actors toward the EU.  
5.1.6.1 China and the EU relationship can be considered, as China is a second leading trade partner 
of EU and is on the first place of import partners (Appendix 3).  
In the beginning of the debt crisis China did not wanted to invest in European debt as it is but saw 
better investments prospects in infrastructure and industry. China invested in many MS in different 
areas of industry, playing an essential role for Europe (Kim, Meunier, & Nyiri, 2012). At some 
point, they wanted to avoid risky investments and preferred to wait when the European Stability 
Mechanism will be in charge as the EU’s bailout fund. Now Premier Minister Wen Jiabao of China 
stated that they have positive attitude to play a bigger part in the EU bailout, supporting not only 
politically but as well as practically and will help with funding the ESM. He also stated that the 
main efforts of resolving the debt issue should come from MS and those MS which face the debt 
should implement proper financial policies which match their real situation. His point was that there 
is a need for a change in order to make it easier for the Union to survive, to show others that they 
can solve problems and how they will do it. Not all think optimistic about it, Zhao Junjie, an expert 
on European studies with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; consider that Germany is not 
just asking China for a financial support, said. "Germany is trying to establish a comprehensive 
cooperation mechanism with China so that the European debt problem can be solved in a more 
efficient way."  Zhao Junjie attitude towards the EU could be seen as a pessimistic, from his words 
it looks like he wants to show Germany as a smart player, who wants to solve the problems of the 
Union by using other global actors (M&C, 2012; Guangjin & Wa, 2012).   
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Yet, China is interested in helping the EU and even being part of the bailout fund. At some point it 
is a relief for the EU to know that they could rely on others and that there is a prospect for them to 
solve their crisis.  
5.1.6.2 The USA is the main trade partner of the EU and also in exporting goods. It is also in top 
three positions for import (Appendix 3). They have bilateral relationships, for the USA the EU is 
also important as a main trading partner of USA. They are each other’s most significant source of 
foreign direct investments (Commission, 2006). The US and EU are so close to each other that any 
slowdown in the EU could be felt in the US. Some US companies are losing their profit due to the 
tight relationships with the EU and it slower the overall economy. The US economy is very 
vulnerable to the EU crisis due to its own problems in the economy (Liedtke, 2011). In the 
beginning of the crisis in the Europe, the US decided to be as an observer. Sebastian Mallaby, a 
senior fellow for international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, proposed that there is 
no use for USA to help shaping European fiscal and financial policies because they had big 
problems on their own, "lecturing from American leaders at this point simply doesn't work. We 
don't have the moral standing to say to people, 'Listen guys, we know how to run an economy and 
here's how you do it'" (Geewax, 2011).  On another hand, the US started to pay more attention to 
China and other developing nations, trying to focus on creating closer ties with it. The same 
situation happens with the EU which is also looking into relationship with China more seriously 
(Geewax, 2011). 
But both nations have seen the rapid development of China, which made them to realize that there is 
a need to not only concentrate on the China, but work on the EU-US relations. “There is a cruel 
irony to the story,” said Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “In 
that Washington has finally come to the realization that it is in America’s interests to have as strong 
a Europe as possible — and the partner that the U.S. now hopes for is not the partner it has (Castle, 
2012).” Because of this line of thoughts, Washington made an assumption of possible support of aid 
to Europe from the International Monetary Fund, where US is a biggest shareholder. But there were 
no actual agreement made on this step, rather US thinks that EU has the ability to handle its own 
problems, and would like to offer an advice on rescue programs based on their experience during 
the US financial crisis 2008 (Reuters, Barack Obama says US willing to help Europe resolve debt 
crisis, 2011 A).  
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The US has sensed the rise of developing countries and due to that has changed their outlook 
towards the EU crisis; being more neutral in the beginning, but starting to want to play a role in the 
debt crisis bailout. They can see the need for supporting debt crisis in order not to feel threat from 
China side. From the EU perspective, it will be relevant to get some extra help from US, not only by 
advises, but also economically. Again there could be seen mutually beneficial relationship in this 
case (Geewax, 2011; Reuters, 2011 A).  
5.1.6.3 Russia is in the top three partners of the EU in trade, export and import. It is approximate up 
to 75% of FDI stocks in Russia come from the EU Member States (Commission, Russia, 2012). 
There is a dependence of Russia from the EU; the last one also supported Russia when it was trying 
to enter the World Trade organisation (WTO). This support was very important for Russia (Chechel 
& Rose , 2011).   
Russia is open to any requests from the EU in the case of support of combating the debt crisis in the 
EU; it is in addition ready to help finance regional anti-crisis methods via the International 
Monetary Fund. This willingness is coming due to the reason that crisis could affect the possibility 
and nature of collaboration with Russia. The government of Russia has stated that there is no 
possibility for Russia to participate directly financing the EU countries anti –crisis measures, but it 
can offer help through the IMF (Novosti, Russia ready to help EU fight debt crisis via IMF, 2011 
A). 
Russia considers that Europe’s failure to stop the crisis could influence on the global economy and 
provide another financial downturn, undermining demand for Russian products. And after helping 
the euro region through IMF, the world’s biggest energy exporter desires to raise the weight of 
developing nations in the International Monetary Fund (Meyer, 2011).  
Russian government is prepared to spend up to $10 billion through International Monetary Fund 
structures. They were the first from BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South African 
Republic) who offered their help to the Europe. Such willingness could be seen as a good gesture 
for the EU in supporting Russian in the World Trade Organization. "This is moral support for EU's 
loyalty in Russia's admittance to the WTO" (Novosti, 2011 B). 
For the EU it is also a good opportunity due to the reason that for Russia-EU relations are very 
important and they will try to help in any case in order not to let down one of their main investors.  
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5.1.7 Trust in the market  
 
One of the points which prevents the Europe from solving it crisis is a lack of trust in the market. 
Another big issue is that there is distrust among MS, which begin to be more sceptical to each other 
(Northern EU thinks that Southern EU cannot use their benefits wisely, so the first once can provide 
some help, but do not want to go above the level) (Eichengreen, 2012). Average people still trust 
and think that the European Union can handle the crisis (diagram and Appendix 4). 
Table C: 
 
Source:  http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb73/eb73_first_en.pdf  
But this is not enough in order to create better economic situation in the market. Looking in to the 
picture, it is seen that trust in the government in the EU (represented by three economically strong 
members) has been lower than in business. Now they are almost at the same level. One of the 
reasons for that could be the lack of public trust in the banking and financial service industry (on the 
second diagram) from where the economical crisis began to develop in year 2008. Without trust in 
the financial system, it will be hard in the future to re-establish broader economic confidence and 
with it a long-lasting economic improvement. Economists believe that the trust could be restored 
with the help of policy – makers, which should launch a stable and sustainable regulatory structure 
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and that bankers should themselves deal with their damaged past governance and management 
practices (Lewis, 2012). 
Table D: 
 
Source:  http://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanInsights/2012-edelman-trust-barometer-global-deck 
Table E: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  http://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanInsights/2012-edelman-trust-barometer-global-deck  
In both cases in the bottom are banks and financial services 
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5.2 Political part 
The politics of the European Union (EU) is argued to be, at best, complex. With the undergoing 
economic crisis, the situation has become even more complicated, as it is argued that in Europe, two 
types of crisis are unravelling : a) of the institutions and b) of ratification (Fourier, 2012).This 
section will present the EU as a political institution and analysis it in the light of the undergoing 
crisis, with focus on the EU’s role as a global actor.  
Firstly, power has been categorised in ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power. Soft power is according to Joseph 
Nye ‘the ability to structure a situation so that other nations develop preferences or define their 
interests in way consistent with ones own nation’  (Nye cited in Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 312). 
Hard Power is mainly understood as military power. With the hard power as military capability and 
the soft power being more complex. Soft power is suggested to be that of trade, economics, and 
diplomacy among others. It is suggested to be the kind of power the EU contains, when acting 
globally (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, pp. 104-107).  
Secondly, the neo-liberal agenda needs to be understood, as a force of globalisation and trade-
liberalisation. Neo-liberalism is the reinvention of liberalism and is described by its critics as 
merely the advocate of one particular aspect of liberalism, the economical liberalism.  Economical 
liberalism is based on minimal state intervention, maximum individual participation in a free and 
self-regulating market (Thorsen & Lie , 2009, p. 2). This is argued to be the main force behind the 
globalisation process. 
This neo-liberal discourse to development is known as the ‘Washington Consensus’, a term coined 
in 1989 by economist John Williamson  (Gore, 2000, p. 790). It is outlined as set economic policies, 
pursued by Bretton Wood institutions, in which ‘market fundamentalism’, minimal state 
involvement and macroeconomic stability are regarded central to economic growth and stability 
(Önis & Şenses, 2005, s. 264). According to Williamson (Williamson, 1990, p. 18) the Washington 
agenda for the rest of the world can be summarised as “...prudent macroeconomic policies, outward 
orientation, and free-market capitalism” which furthers economic interdependency and 
globalisation. This neoliberal orthodoxy is argued to have had significant practical influence on key 
Washington-based institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (Önis & Şenses, 2005, s. 264). 
In this section, the internal struggles of the EU will be considered for analytical purposes, but is not 
the focus.  Even with multiple member-states experiencing domestic political struggles and 
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government changes, the focus will mainly be on the EU as a single actor. This is done through 
analysis of EU’s global political impact and the importance of internal economic stability, as it is 
argued: 
“The short-term challenge in both the West and the Rest is to avoid more profligate fiscal and 
monetary policies, intrusive micro-economic regulations and trade protectionism. The medium-term 
challenge is to restore macro-economic order and crack on with micro-economic reforms. These are 
steep political challenges” (Sally, 2012). 
How these political challenges are to be dealt with is another concern of the EU. There is an on-
going debate of how and which integration theory is most suitable for the purpose of describing the 
decision-making process of the EU (Pollack M. A., 2010, pp. 20-22). Latest with the Fiscal 
Compact, and the on-going rectification process, which is considered to not only be a major tool for 
financial regulation, but also very important political instrument (Fourier, 2012). 
However, before applying theories, it is necessary to understand the pre-crisis political framework 
regarding the EU’s economy. It is argued that the modern economical foundation of the EU was  
created with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Begg, 2012, p. 108).  The main aspects of the treaty were 
assigned to monetary policies, with special attention to the Euro-area countries leaving out national 
competence for fiscal policy and structural policies. Fiscal policies are constrained for all 27 
Member States through the excessive deficit provisions of the treaty which establish rules on fiscal 
discipline. ‘Participating Member States’ are also subject to a corrective arm of the Stability and 
Growth Pact with the threat of fines for those that ‘do not correct an excessive deficit in a timely 
manner’ (Begg, 2012, p. 108).   
 
The attempt of the pre-crisis economic framework, was followed up by the 2000 attempt of the 
Lisbon Treaty ‘re-launched’ in 2005, with the main focus on growth and employment (Begg, 2012, 
p. 108).  With the Lisbon treaty, the sanction option of the EU was only to ‘recommend’ the 
member states to change (Begg, 2012, pp. 108-109). This indicates the limits of the EU’s power, 
even when dealing with its own. These sanction opportunities have now been tried revised, with the 
Fiscal compact. But the process negotiation needs to be understood. In order to do so, the policy 
creation needs to be analysed in the light of the integration theories. 
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The first theory, Historical Institutionalism, stresses the member-states and actors’ fixed preferences 
through unchanged characteristics as well as ‘path-dependency’ of previous polices, norms and 
routines (Pollack M. A., 2010; Schimmelfennig & Rittberger, 2010). This theory is believed to 
predict no change of the EU and its institutions, as well as it argues for level of predictability in 
policy-making processes.  
Nonetheless, during the economic crisis, the EU has increasingly produced more economic 
legislation as well as attempted to create a more disciplined atmosphere regarding the control and 
regulation of the these policies  (Obi, 2011). 
As mentioned in the economics section, the EU can be considered sub-divided with the ‘Euro 
member-states’, and the ‘non-Euro member-states’ (Candelon, Muysken, & Vermeulen, 2010, p. 
324). Previously, the economic policies were mainly directed toward the first category members, 
however, now the EU as a whole has become a part of the financial matters. What was seen as 
financial problem on the national- level is now attempted to be restored at an EU level, latest with 
the Fiscal Compact in 2011 (Kim, Meunier, & Nyiri, 2012). 
This can be argued as a response to changed conditions, but in historical institutionalism, such 
changes only occurs through substantial ‘chocks’ (Jupille & Caporaso, 1999). Instead of change, 
this theory predicts that the ‘look in’ effect of actors through polices, are more likely to maintain the 
political institution, even when the conditions are changed (Pollack M. A., 2010, pp. 23-26). 
Ferran argues in his paper, that the EU “is effectively ‘trapped’ by the legacy effects of past 
decisions and that its options for dealing with that discomfort are quite constrained” (Ferran, 2012, 
p. 35), indicating the significance of “look in’s” and path-dependency (Ferran, 2012, p. 33; Copsey 
& Haughton, 2009, p. 270).  
 
The level of policy ‘look-in’ is also felt by politicians and commentators as Chairman of the Centre 
for Liberal Strategies non-governmental organisation Ivan Krastev warned: "What we are seeing as 
a result of the economic crisis is a dismantling of the welfare states. We are not in the world to 
make it into a European Union anymore; we don't have the capacity for that as the austerity state is 
going to be here for some time. In places like China, you can change policies but not governments 
whereas in Europe now you can change governments but not policies (Carroll, 2012). 
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Likewise, Burgoon argues that the EU’s ‘open market ideology’ promotes a better and more 
competitive market which on the economical front only makes the neo-liberal process beneficial 
(Burgoon, 2001). The debate of how the EU impact on national policies ranks from arguments of a 
decreased national spending and state intervention as globalization leads to a more ‘market-
friendly’ policies (Garrett & Lange 1991, Gill 1995, Cox 1997, Cited in Nielsen & Kesting, 2003, 
p.367) , others argue that a more protectionist stance has developed due to more insecure economies 
(Kim & Karen, 2009, p. 131).  
 
Even with this perspective of the danger of ‘look-in’s’, new institutions were created during the 
crises. As the financial policy is argued to be at the top of EU’s agenda post 2009, the European 
Systemic Risk Council (now ‘board’, rather than council: ESRB) and a European System of 
Financial Supervisors (ESFS) were set up and became operational in January 2011 (Begg, 2012, p. 
111). 
 
Although the sectorial European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) will not, in general, directly 
supervise financial companies, on the grounds that the national authorities will be closer to their 
respective regulations, there are special provisions for credit ratings. As early as in December 2010, 
the legislation for setting up a new pan-European supervisory authority was agreed 2011 (Begg, 
2012, p. 112; appendix 1). It includes provisions for directly supervising credit rating agencies by 
the ESMA, and there is scope for fining agencies which breach rules within prescribed limits and 
subject to specific procedures (Begg, 2012, pp. 112-114; Copsey & Haughton, 2009, pp. 270-272). 
 
Nonetheless, the danger of the Historical Institutional theory, is the awareness of the existing future 
effects. This promotes a cautious behaviour of the actors, which is suggested to slow the decision-
making process and reduce political will (appendix 1). The fixed preferences for the actors, thus 
become more valuable, as the integration-process continues (Jupille & Caporaso, 1999; Stubb, 
1996). This was demonstrated when British Prime Minister as one of two Head of States, declined 
to be a part to the 2011 Fiscal Compact, as he feared for the future consequences of committing to it 
(Reuters, 2011 B). 
 
Differently, the second theory of Sociological integration, gives a better opportunity to analyse the 
increase in economic policies and financial restrictions. With the argument for a change in actors’ 
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behaviour and national preferences, the theory is based is based on interaction and the exposure to 
norms and unwritten rules, the EU’s response to the crisis can be considered in a different 
perspective (Spendzharova, 2012, p. 328). The Sociological institutionalism is argued to be better at 
describing continuity, than change (Schmidt V. A., 2010).  
Even with changes in the political environment, the level of norms and social-procedures are argued 
to remain an integrated part of the EU’s institutions. When creating the Fiscal Compact, the 
economic path might have been fairly straight regarding the euro-monetarist model, however, the 
bargaining and negotiation process, remained an actor-based social interaction. In the same way the 
November 2010 set-up of new financial intuitions, only were reached after rather difficult 
negotiations between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament over a number of 
aspects of their functioning, agreement was reached in on the details of these new bodies and a new 
system became operational in January 2011 (Begg, 2012, p. 111; appendix 1). 
 
The development of more legislation and systems, fits with the theory, however, due to the social 
interactions, it is argued that from a governance perspective, soft law devices (such as peer pressure 
or naming and shaming) are the first line of enforcement and, especially for the excessive imbalance 
procedure, it is difficult to see the jump to financial sanctions being easily accepted (Begg, 2012, p. 
117). 
 
Thirdly, the agenda based decision-making procedure is best considered through the discourse 
institutionalism. This wide theoretical approach is emphasised though more individually based 
actions, and is demonstrated through political reactions to changes in the EU policies. It is argued, 
that the new financial policy makes politicians’ “sensitive about the part of finance ministers for 
two reasons: subsidiarity and the fact that any change in a budget is likely to have political as well 
as economic consequences”  (Begg, 2012, pp. 116-117). Here the national discourse and fear off not 
being re-elected come into play, influencing the outer appearance of the EU, as a weak institution. 
Through this perspective, the acceptance of the ideas of change is more likely to happen, as it is the 
representation of idea through discourse, including frames, narratives, myths, stories which is 
argued to form the way the agenda is perceived (Roe, 1994; Hajer, 2003; Schmidt V. A., 2010, p. 
3).  
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This is demonstrated through the way politicians try to solve the problems, as it is based in the 
individual actors own normative framework, to decide which problem to deal with. In addition to 
define the methods of how by tracking the appropriateness of the overall situation in the norms and 
principles view (Schmidt V. , 2008). DI also argues for a normative perspective –normative ideas 
look how aspirations and ideas of the public is met by the politicians, how policies or programs 
correlate with the norms and principals of the public living – like the issue of an upcoming national 
election (Schmidt V. , 2008). However, this is an ‘internal matter’ of the member states, and the 
national affairs, will not be considered by the global actors, when the EU is execution its politics 
(appendix 1). 
From another perspective, is that the creation of more financial policies and other measurements to 
be considered as a response to the lack of market trust, and not as an attempt to restore the member-
states. With the temporary abolishment of competition law, combined with increased economical 
discipline and surveillance upon the member states some aspects of the EU's identity are 
compromised. Here the discourse integration theory can be useful to explain the change in 
behaviour. Instead of strong democratic values and the safeguard of the weaker member states, the 
EU has taken a more market oriented approach, in support of the neo-liberal agenda and market 
stability. The challenge is now suggested to be to raise ‘credibility of the proposed sanctions’ 
(Begg, 2012, p. 117). 
The EU can be perceived as a single unit in global aspects. Even with multiple economies within, 
the outer actions relating to soft power, economic interference and foreign politics establishes the 
EU as a single actor. It is argued, that with the creation of the 2008 Lisbon treaty, the EU had 
greatness ‘thrust upon’ it, while establishing the EU as an international actor (Howorth, 2010, p. 
456). With the creation of the Presidency of the Council and the position of High-Representative-
Vice-President, the union is now represented by single individuals, in the same way as a country or 
republic (Howorth, 2010, pp. 456-457; Smith, 2011, p. 145). However, the EU cannot be 
considered a ‘world power’ in the more common sense, as it is argued to lack “political and 
constitutional unity. It does not enjoy ‘sovereignty’ in the traditional Westphalian [sic] sense, either 
internally or externally. Its ambitions, both internal and external, are constrained by an ongoing 
tension between the Union itself and its Member States” (Howorth, 2010, p. 458). 
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Even though the EU does not hold qualities of a common actor, it is argued to have some impact. 
There is an on-going scholarly debate about the soft- and hard powers of the EU, due to the 
complexity of its political institutions and organisation. One suggestion of the division of the: 
“EU’s efforts as a global actor do conform to three basic components of grand strategy: physical 
security; economic prosperity; and value projection” (Smith, 2011, p. 144) as well that “ in areas 
which are core to the ‘European project’, it seems clear that the EU is more disposed to use 
normative power”. 
 
During the economic crisis, the sentiment of the EU’s lack of leadership was described by Polish 
foreign affairs minister Radoslaw Sikorski acknowledged that Europe seemed "unable to make 
quick decisions when a crisis arises"(quoted by Carroll, 2012). And evaluating the EU as a global 
actor, he added: "Countries are still knocking on our door territorially but if we cannot fix our 
neighbourhood, then we cannot act globally" (quoted by Carroll, 2012). One way to improve the 
pace and quality of EU leadership would be to create a democratically elected leader of the 
European Council – said Sikorski, adding: "Herman Van Rompuy's term as president was extended 
two weeks ago, but most people didn't notice. We need a leader elected by the European Parliament 
or even wider than that."  (quoted by Carroll, 2012). Here the administration procedure, and the 
creation of supranational policies and rules are important. Hereby, financial measurement like the 
‘Euro Stability Bond’ become more a political and psychological event, but with economical and 
democratic consequence. 
 
The reason for creating a single Eurobond, is argued to be force when jointly guaranteed by all 17 
euro area members is widely regarded as a development capable of easing the short-term strains on 
liquidity and offering an enduring answer for the funding of euro area governments' debt at 
reasonable rates (Begg, 2012, p. 118; appendix 1). 
 
The European Commission (2011) has now published a discussion paper about how such 
Eurobonds could be introduced so as to meet these and other objections, making a rather crass 
attempt to forestall German antagonism by eschewing the term Eurobonds in favour of ‘Stability 
bonds’. While the label is unlikely to fool anyone, the paper has the merit of putting the issue firmly 
on the table, forcing Germany, the Netherlands and other net creditor Member States to explain why 
it will not work (Begg, 2012, pp. 118-119). 
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But how come this Stability Bond is necessary? The EU is argued to react fairly fast to the crisis, as 
the ECB as early as 2007 injected more liquidity into the financial system among other 
‘unconventional measures’, which has been done at some risk to the integrity of the ECB’s mandate 
and independence (Begg, 2012, p. 110;115). However, the individual member states’ response to 
the contingency of the crisis has been described as ‘fire-fighting’ (Begg, 2012, p. 110). This was 
due to the uncoordinated policy creation and nationalisation of banks, finance sectors and building 
societies. Even though the crisis hit the member states differently, the result was more than 40 
financial intermediaries had to be re-capitalised, requiring permission from the European 
Commission to overlook standard competition rules governing state aids to competitive companies 
(Begg, 2012, p. 111).  
 
With the changed position of the EU’s economic ability, it is impact on the crisis management and 
in particular the suggested creation of Euro stability bonds. Where the neo-liberal agenda of open 
market ideology previously were considered with, often hectic debate, the creation of Euro Stability 
bonds and more strict financial discipline in EU is received with outcry due to the sudden 
integration of national economies and the question of subsidiarity (Foster, 2010, p. 26). 
 
One of the main arguments for the failing of economical recovery in EU as a whole, is the lack of 
emphasis on collective, overall policies, instead of the focus on national (Begg, 2012, p. 116; 
Copsey & Haughton, 2009, p. 270). It is even argued by Erkki Tuomioja that “EU countries do not 
want joint foreign policy countries are more divided on foreign policy now than before the Lisbon 
Treaty came along” (9th March 2012). 
Another major critique of the EU was ‘quite simply, that the crisis management has been too little, 
too late, too poorly communicated to markets and citizens alike, and too lacking in decisive 
leadership’ (Begg, 2012, p. 120; Spendzharova, 2012, p. 328). These are the factors that can impact 
on the EU as a global actor, as the way the Union is perceived in the global community, reflects the 
actions of the Unions ability in future politics. 
 
This is, however, not directly understood as changing the EU’s position in the world, when relating 
to the United States of America. United States senator Jeanne Shaheen talked positively of the long-
serving partnership between America and Europe, stating: "Our relationship with Europe is the 
most special one we have; we have the biggest economic trade in the world and a security 
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partnership that goes back decades. We see Europe as being engaged in the world when it comes to 
places like Libya, Iran and Afghanistan." But she admitted disappointment at the slow pace of 
decision-making when it came to crafting a solution to the financial crisis. "We would have liked to 
have seen faster action" (Carroll, 2012). 
In relation the China, the situation is a bit different due to China’s economic rise is also making the 
Chinese political and security apparatus feel more confident (Huang, Mathews, Pei, Pettis, Pothier, 
& Stephens, 2010). Beijing is therefor argued to feel it can be more aggressive on its core interests 
than it has been in the past, leading to tension in the political and security arena. Nevertheless, 
China’s relationship to the EU has changed during the crisis. China is argued to be a very rational 
global actor (Tan-Mullins, Mohan, & Power, 2010, p. 860), so with the financial crisis influencing 
EU’s members states credit-ratings, the investment opportunities. Instead China, has been suggested 
to be a future aid provider, along line the USA in the post-war period. This to further its export-
market and maintain China’s own economy, but can also be a wise diplomatic move due to 
unwanted tensions with the USA (Huang, Mathews, Pei, Pettis, Pothier, & Stephens, 2010) 
From the Chinese perspective, the growing trade imbalances are creating friction with the United 
States and increasingly leading to tension with Europe. By investing in the EU, an economical tie 
can strengthen the political goodwill. The West’s exclusive focus on the exchange rate as a potential 
solution to this problem which from a Chinese perspective is considered misguided and argued only 
exacerbate tensions (Huang, Mathews, Pei, Pettis, Pothier, & Stephens, 2010). China is currently 
the world’s largest polluter in terms of hydrocarbons. Beijing sees global environmenta l standards 
as appropriate for developed countries, but not for developing ones like China. This puts its 
interests in direct conflict with the West. China’s rise is creating a world with three distinct poles of 
power: North America, Europe, and Asia (including China). In this context, it is argued, there are 
numerous opportunities for Europe to strengthen its relationship with China by focusing on shared 
interests over competing ones (Huang, Mathews, Pei, Pettis, Pothier, & Stephens, 2010). 
As a third global actor and trades-partner, Russia role has strengthen during the crisis. In 
relationship to the EU, Russia has not only an economical interest in securing the EU’s market, but 
the political and diplomatic balance is considered even more important. As mentioned in the  
  
46 
 
economics section, the Russian interest in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is closely 
connected with goodwill from the European member states (Gardner, 2009). 
The energy supply to the EU from Russia, is argued to be used as a bargaining tool. As Chizhov 
said that Russia's 15-year negotiations on WTO membership are “in their final stage” and that 
“Russia expects EU support” on what is a “priority” issue for Russia. The Commission too talked 
on 5 February of bringing “the process to a conclusion soon” (cited by Gardner, 2009). 
These highlight the demand to the EU as a global actor, in relation to diplomacy, trade and energy. 
A common theme of critique is the lack of unity and collective actions from the EU, leading to a 
decrease in foreign affairs politics, foreign aid and internal willingness to solve it as a union.  
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6. Discussion 
From the above standing findings, it becomes clear that the EU’s position as a global actor is 
ambiguous. The economic crisis has demonstrated the world economies to be interlinked and has 
exposed some weakness to the globalisation and the neo-liberal market ideology. This was 
established through what started as the American crisis of ‘the housing bubble’. It was at first 
considered to be a private economic crisis, but spread easily to Europe and the rest of the world, 
ending up as a full blown economic crisis on national level (Chossudovsky & Marchall, 2010; 
Eichengreen, 2010). 
Different integration theories have tried to determine the ways of the EU’s policy making and 
interaction. During the crisis, it has been suggested that EU has suffered from lack of political 
ability (K.H., 2011; Maduro, 2011; Smith, 2011). However, the EU has managed to create policies 
and decide on some financial regulation (Commission, 2012). The new policies and regulations are 
considered to impact on the member-states as it reinforces an economic agenda with closer EU 
surveillance, an area previously only concerning the member-states (Commission, 2012). This 
raises the question of the principal of subsidiarity (Foster, 2010, p. 26). 
Yet, the attempts are argued to be similar to ‘fire-fighting’, demonstrating the uncoordinated, 
fractured nature of the EU when manoeuvring large-scale issues with a heave national interest for 
its members-states (Begg, 2012, p. 110). Latest with the Fiscal Compact, which has been called a 
‘suicide pact’ (Stiglitz 2012, quoted by Moore, 2012). The economical ability and political 
influence, is argued not have managed to exploit the ‘window of opportunity’ and lacked the skill to 
educate the financial systems within (Commission, 2009, p. 3). 
The member-states has also experience a high level of pressure, from its own population, as well as 
from the EU. The unstable situation, has led to many chaotic government changes, some were made 
through the instalments of technocrats, while others through elections, yet unable to form 
governments (Hopkins, 2012). Which has led to the argument, that the crisis does not change 
politics; it changes governments (Godoy, 2011). 
The lack of coordinated actions is argued to be one of the core critiques of the EU, in relation to its 
ability as a global actor (Eichengreen, 2012; Kappel, 2011; Gardner, 2009). As it is argued to be 
influencing the EU’s as a global actor, as it limits the Unions impact through ‘soft power’. Besides 
the diplomatic competences, the EU regards itself as a generous in relation to foreign air in 
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developing countries. This is argued to be a major part in the EU’s self-perception, inside and when 
viewed from around the world. However, with an economical crisis, the money-supply risk runs dry  
(Popescu, 2011). 
The EU’s lack of fulfilment as a global actor is suggested to impact on its stance in the world order. 
In relation to China, Russia and the USA, EU plays different roles.  
With the economic crisis reaching the EU, the weak economy is suggest to have influenced the 
creation of a new global market order, and a change in dominance (Castle, 2012; Commission, 
2012; Gardner, 2009). Such change might create fear for countries with the leading position at the 
moment. This has led to speculations of safe-guarding of own markets, by supporting weaker 
economies, like the EU. Russia is argued to be a more generous trades-partner supporting the IMF, 
where the Chinese is more cautious in relation to the money-flow, and focusses on the ESM 
(Bloomberg, China Willing to Buy Bonds From Sovereign-Debt-Crisis Nations, Zhang Says, 2011 
B; Guangjin & Wa, 2012).  
In order to prevent the threat of global change in markets share, the dominant parts will try to help 
countries and organisations which are most important for them in terms of keeping their global 
position. Nonetheless, the support of a foreign nation is not for free, and is argued that the need for 
political changes is necessary to attract stronger economies. This could be seen as other global 
actors attempt to influence the EU’s political focus, by supporting them during their dark period, 
building up political goodwill, and a stronghold of debt. 
Nothing is made without a second thought when it comes to the politics. For Russia, for example, it 
is important that the EU will recover, due to the reason that the EU is the main investor for Russia, 
so they know that their economy depends on the state European markets. In the case of China and 
the USA, they agree to help the EU. Yet, China and the USA both argue, that EU can manage itself 
to solve its debt crisis, or should make internal changes to promote change. 
The question arises here: do these global actors want the EU to become weaker as a political union 
and global actor? Is the aid a true sign of goodwill and the common strong-stand in an attempt to 
recover from the global crisis? Or is it really an attempt to promote own rules and opinions into the 
EU when it’s weakened, so that this can benefit global actors in the future?  
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When looking into the EU’s decision-making policy-process, three integration theories were 
considered: Historical institutionalism, Sociological institutionalism and Discourse institutionalism. 
The analyses shows, that EU’s cannot be tied to one integration theory only. It is considered to be 
very flexible at points, but also argued to be seen as unreliable due to this instability. None of the 
theories appear to create the full picture of the EU’s internal turmoil, but seem to be using elements 
from all three theories that were presented above, depending on the situation. Some may say that it 
is a good way to be flexible and adjust to the situation, make decisions depending on the situation, 
not following the frames due to which will be harder to adjust. However, when the member-states 
cannot agree on a clear-cut political direction, internal problems in the EU are treated as national 
problems on a national level, and not as a problem of the EU as a whole. Hereby, the lack of 
integration is undermining the EUs ability to be perceived as a strong global actor (Kappel, 2011) 
From this perspective, the remaining global actors could assume that the EU is instable in relation 
to its decision-making-process, creating uncertainty of what to expect from the Union, leading to a 
more critical views upon it. However, as the EU lack ‘hard power’, its position is constituted in the 
‘soft power’ approach, raising the question, what is the EU, if it has none?  
The crisis is argued to demonstrate flaws in core-elements to the EU as a political project, but also 
the global financial system as a whole. Even though, the EU is considered to be very keen on the 
integration process within the Union, it has proven unable to solve global problems, due to the lack 
of political unity. The EU as a single actor, is demonstrated to be a slow actor, and at times, 
incompetent actor.  
It is argued not only to be the economical problems which creates this lack of ability (appendix 1). 
As the EU is considered to be intensely divide between euro zone member states and other who are 
not in the euro zone, both politically and economically. This aspect is not analysed in debt, but is 
argued to enhance the atmosphere that creates tension within the EU as a whole, and limits its 
ability act as a unit.  
This has to some extent led to the feeling of the European Union to be an immature actor, as a 
global actor due to the reason it is not able to establish order in ’its own house’. This could be one 
of the reasons for why other global actors have suggested policy changes to the EU.  
50 
 
Considering that the Union is to some extent is very flexible in its processes, it could adopt changes 
easily. However, due to the fractured nature of the union itself, it is difficult to form one single 
opinion, when involving 27 member-states, and it is not believed to become easier over time.  
Therefore, there is a presence of internal pressure, for the EU to change – however no agreement of 
what sort of change. At the same time, there is an external pressure for a stronger EU to manage the 
crisis, leaving the EU in a possible bigger mess, than ever foreseen by its funders.   
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7. Conclusion 
The purpose of this project was to find out, if the economic crisis had influence the EU as a global 
actor, and whether the other global actors perceive it in the different way afterwards. The project 
sought to analyse this, by applying integration theories, to the decision-made during the current 
economic crisis. For this purpose, sociological, historical and discursive institutionalism, were 
selected, and shaped a basis understanding of the internal functioning of the decision-making 
procedures of the EU.  
The theoretical approach enhanced the understanding of how the EU acts on the global political 
scene. In order to create an understanding of the economical situation in the EU, the project 
presented a brief introduction into Euro-monetarist, Realist and Neo-liberal theories.  
By dividing the economical analysis and the political analysis, it was possible to apply different 
theories to the same subject. (1) Firstly, the economical part was looking into the economical 
situation of the EU. This was in order to analyse how the crisis has developed and which measures 
have been taken in order to overcome the crisis. Three main EU trade partners were selected – the 
USA, China and Russia. Here, it became important to look into how the trade partners perceived the 
EU’s crisis management, as well as analyse whether the trade partners were willing to support the 
EU financially. (2) Secondly, the political part analysed the political situation of the EU as a global 
actor as well as its actions based on the three integration theories.  
From this analysis it could be drawn, that the EU is very flexible in terms of the application of 
integration theories. This should be understood in the way, that all three theories can be applied to 
the decision-making processes. Hereby, in global politics, the EU can adjust to the changes, as it has 
no fixed way in relation to its internal matters. This brings up the idea of the EU being able to 
change when needed.  
Based on findings above, the EU can maintain its position as one of the global actors,  and continue 
its important role in relation to some of the other global actors. This is due to the dynamic relation 
of the EU as a trade partner, and will be enforced due to strong market\economy dependence to the 
remaining trades partners. 
During the crisis, trade partners of the EU have not only been willing to support financially but have 
also put a pressure onto the EU for political and economic changes. The research findings were 
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unexpected, due to the previous scepticism towards the EU and its internal crisis. On the other hand, 
due to globalisation, the interdependency and connection of the global economies is high, and has 
emphasised the need for a more united global stance.  
Hereby, the crisis is not understood as eliminating the overall perception of the EU, but it could 
obstruct the policy making in the future. The global actors gives the EU an opportunity to change, 
and show itself as a reliable actor who considers others experience and point of view.  
However, if no change is detected, the appearance of the EU as a global actor could be transformed 
significantly. The other global actors might increase their scepticism towards the EU, considering it 
as a player who does not take any advice in relation to other opinions on the global matters. Hereby, 
the EU can lose its opportunity to show itself as an actor, as it’s only political tool – soft power – 
has been erupted.    
To conclude, the financial crisis made the EU very unstable economically and called for assistance 
from other global actors. The foundation of the Union as a global actor is in itself ambiguous, due to 
the many voices within. The lack of leadership from the EU was met with criticism and its actions 
when managing the crisis were described as ‘fire-fighting’. This is argued to be due to the absence 
of a clear strategy of the EU internally, which is then mirrored in the Unions actions as global actor 
externally. 
The position of the EU as a global actor may not have been altered dramatically, but the financial 
crisis has if anything exposed some fundamental flaws in the EU as whole. However, the way this 
exposure is perceived by the global community, can pose a challenge to the future of the EU.  
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Appendix Overview 
Appendix 1: Time table, development of the crisis 2008-2011 
Adapted from: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-09/european-crisis-
timeline-from-maastricht-treaty-to-fiscal-union-agreement.html  
Appendix 2:  
Table 1: Average Annual Growth %, 1980-2009 
Table 2: Growth Export %, 1980-2009 
 
Source:  
 http://www.giga-  
hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1101.pdf 
 
 Table 3: GDP %, Growth import and Export 2008-2010 
 
 Source: 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres11_e/pr628_e.html 
Appendix 3:  
Table 4: Leading Partner Countries of the EU27 in Merchandise Trade (excluding  
intra-EU trade) 2006-2011 
 
Table 5: Leading Supplier Countries of the EU27 in Merchandise Trade (excluding  
intra-EU trade) 2006-2011 
 
Table 6: Leading Client Countries of the EU27 in Merchandise Trade (excluding  
intra-EU trade) 2006-2011 
 
Source:  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122529.pdf 
Appendix 4:  
Table 7: QA4: How would you judge the current situation in each of following; % EU 
 
Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb73/eb73_first_en.pdf 
Table 8: Several mature markets see double-digit drops in business trust 
 
Source: 
http://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanInsights/2012-edelman-trust-barometer-global-    
 deck   
60 
 
Appendix 1 
 
2008 
 
Sept. 15: Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy, triggering worldwide market panic. 
 
Sept. 30: Ireland guarantees all deposits and most debt liabilities of its banks. Irish 10-year bonds yields 4.590 
percent. 
 
2009 
 
Jan 14: S&P cuts Greece to A- from A. The rating company cites the country’s weakening finances as the global 
economy slowed. Greek 10-year bond yields rise to 5.43 percent the next day. 
 
Jan. 15: Ireland nationalizes Anglo Irish Bank. 
 
Jan. 19: S&P cuts Spain to AA+ from AAA. 
 
May 6: Spanish Finance Minister Elena Salgado sees “green shoots” in Spanish economy. Ten-year bonds yield 3.93 
percent. 
 
Oct. 4:  George Papandreou leads Socialist Pasok Party to landslide victory in Greek elections, beating New 
Democracy by the widest victory margin since 1981 on pledges to boost spending and wages. 
 
Oct. 20: New Greek Finance Minister Papaconstantinou says deficit will balloon to 12.5 percent of GDP this year, more 
than double the previous government’s forecast. Yield on Greek 10- year bond 4.58 percent. 
 
Oct. 26: Former head of Greek National Statistics Service says  his body “holds no responsibility” for the revision of 
deficit figures since 2008. 
 
Nov. 5: Papandreou announces first budget. The plan aims to trim the deficit to 9.4 percent GDP in 2010. 
 
Dec. 16: S&P Cuts Greece to BBB+ from A-, three steps above junk. 
 
2010 
 
Jan. 14: Greece adopts three-year plan to bring the European Union’s biggest budget deficit within the EU limit in 
2012. The same day, ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet said Greece won’t win any special treatment from the central 
bank. 
 
Jan. 21: Papaconstantinou says Greece won’t need a rescue package. The yield on Greece’s 10-year bond reaches 6.248 
percent, a euro-era high. 
 
Jan. 29: EU Commissioner Joaquin Almunia says in Davos there is  no ‘Plan B’ for Greece. “Greece will not default. In 
the euro area, default does not exist.” 
 
Feb. 2: Greek government announces austerity package to get  deficit to 3 percent of GDP in 2012. 
 
Feb. 11: EU leaders hold first emergency summit on Greece. EU agrees to take “determined and coordinated action” to 
protect financial stability of euro area, without giving further details. 
 
Feb. 15: Papaconstantinou says “we are basically trying to  change the course of the Titanic. People think we are in a 
terrible mess. And we are.” 
 
March 4: Germany snubs aid for Greece in “historic moment” for EU as protesters seize Finance Ministry in Athens. 
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March 8: Portuguese government announces new budget cuts, more asset sales and a freeze on public wages. 
 
March 10: Former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi says  Greece’s problems are “completely over. I don’t see any 
other case now in Europe.” 
 
March 16: Euro-region finance ministers lay groundwork for making emergency loans available to aid Greece. S&P 
affirms Greece BBB+ rating and takes it off Creditwatch negative. Papaconstantinou says the EU needs a “loaded gun” 
to fend off speculators. 
 
March 18: Papandreou calls on EU partners to come up with specific aid measures within a week to help Greece, hints 
he might seek support from IMF if EU partners don’t act. 
 
March 24: Fitch cuts Portugal’s credit rating to AA-. 
 
March 25: Trichet says that the ECB will continue to accept bonds rated as low as BBB- as collateral, reversing his 
January refusal to give Greece special treatment. Later that day in Brussels, Trichet abandons his opposition to IMF 
involvement in a Franco-German plan to give Greece bilateral loans at market rates. 
 
March 26: Head of Greek debt agency says rescue deal “wipes out  the risk of default.” 
 
March 30: Ireland says country’s banks need to raise an  additional 31.8 billion euros of capital. 
 
April 8: Greece’s 10-year bond yield reaches 7.4 percent, pushing the spread on German bunds to a euro-era high of 
442 basis points. 
 
April 12: Euro-area finance ministers agree to provide up to 30 billion euros of loans to Greece over the next year with 
the IMF agreeing to put up another 15 billion euros in funds. 
 
April 21: Greece, facing 8.5 billion euros in bond redemptions  the following month, begins talks with the EU, the ECB 
and the IMF on conditions tied to 45 billion-euro in aid. 
 
April 22: The EU revises Greece’s 2009 budget deficit to 13.6 percent of GDP, higher than the government’s previous 
forecast of 12.9 percent. Ireland overtakes Greece as the EU nation with the largest deficit with its shortfall revised to 
14.3 percent. Moody’s cuts Greece one level to A3. 
 
April 23: Papandreou asks EU for a 45 billion-euro bailout from the EU and IMF, calling it a “a new Odyssey for 
Greece.” “But we know the road to Ithaca and have charted the waters,” he added, referring to the return of 
mythological hero Ulysses to his island home. 
 
April 27: Ireland can “easily” weather the impact of the Greek crisis on financial markets, the country’s debt agency 
head said. 
 
April 27: S&P become first rating company to cut Greece to junk, downgrades Portugal to A-. 
 
April 28: S&P cuts Spain’s credit rating for second time since January 2009, pushing the euro to a one-year low of 
$1.3115. 
 
May 2: Euro-region agrees on a 110 billion-euro rescue package for Greece. Greece agrees to 30 billion euros in 
austerity cuts over the next three years in exchange for the aid. 
 
May 3: The ECB says it will indefinitely accept Greek collateral regardless of the country’s credit rating. 
 
May 5: Protests in Athens against the government’s austerity  plans turn violent and three people are killed when they 
become trapped in a bank set ablaze by demonstrators. 
 
May 6: Greek Parliament approves deficit cuts. Greek 10-year yields reach 12 percent the next day. 
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May 7-8: European leaders agreed to set up an emergency fund to  stem the sovereign crisis and said the workings of the 
financial backstop will be hammered out before the markets open May 10. 
 
May 9-10: EU finance chiefs, in a 14-hour overnight session in Brussels, agree to set up a 750 billion-euros rescue 
mechanism for countries facing financial distress and the ECB said it will buy government and private debt in the 
biggest attempt yet to end the sovereign-debt crisis. The meeting gives birth to the European Financial Stability Facility, 
the region’s temporary bailout mechanism, with initial capital of 440 billion euros. 
 
May 10: Merkel’s party suffers its worst postwar defeat in  Germany’s most populous state after a regional vote 
overshadowed by aid for Greece. The result cost Merkel control of the upper house of parliament. Bundesbank 
President Axel Weber publicly criticizes ECB bond purchases. 
 
May 12-13: Spain announces public-wage cuts and a pension freeze while Portugal says it will lower the salaries of top 
government officials and increase taxes. Spain cuts deficit target to 6 percent in 2011 and trims growth outlook. 
 
May 18: Greece receives its first bailout loan for 14.5 billion euros, one day before 8.5 billion euros in bonds come due. 
 
May 27: Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi unveils 25 billion euros in deficit cuts meant to help “defend the 
euro.” 
 
May 28: Fitch cuts Spain’s AAA rating one level to AA+ 
 
June 23: Greek 10-year bond yield closes above 10 percent for first time in euro’s history. 
 
June 14: Moody’s cuts Greece to junk. 
 
July 13: Greece returns to bond markets for first time since bailout, selling 1.62 billion euros of six-month bills. 
 
July 23: Europe publishes the results of bank stress tests. Only 7 of 91 lenders flunk the test. 
 
Aug 24: S&P cuts Ireland’s credit rating to AA- because of concern over the costs of shoring up the country’s banking  
system. 
 
Sept. 29: Spain’s first general strike in eight years to protest cuts and an increase to the retirement age. 
 
Sept. 30: Ireland prepares to take majority control of Allied Irish Banks Plc and pump extra cash into Anglo Irish Bank 
Corp. Moody’s cuts Spain’s AAA rating to Aa1. 
 
Oct. 4: Greece announce draft budget plan to cut the deficit to 7 percent of GDP in 2011. 
 
Oct. 18: German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy meet in Deauville, France and agree 
that private investors must contribute to future EU bailouts and Sarkozy backs Merkel’s call for a permanent rescue 
mechanism from 2013. 
 
Nov. 4: Trichet signals concern that forcing bondholders to take losses will drive up borrowing costs. 
 
Nov. 12: Seeking to calm markets, finance ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K. issued a statement 
at a G-20 in Seoul saying any private sector involvement would not apply  to outstanding debt and would only come into 
effect from 2013. 
 
Nov. 14: Irish Enterprise Minister Batt O’Keefe says Ireland  doesn’t need a bailout, refutes talk of crisis. 
 
Nov. 21: Ireland says it will apply for a bailout. 
 
Nov. 23: S&P Cuts Ireland two steps to A from AA-. 
 
Nov. 28: Ireland gets 85 billion-euro bailout. European leaders  scale back proposals to inflict losses on bondholders. 
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Dec. 23: Fitch cuts Portugal to A+. 
 
2011 
 
Jan. 14: Fitch follows S&P and Moody’s in cutting Greece to  junk. 
 
Jan. 24: Spain announces new capital requirements for banks. Salgado says the capital shortfall won’t be more than 20 
billion euros. 
 
Feb. 11: Axel Weber resigns from Bundesbank after opposing the ECB’s crisis policy. 
 
Feb. 25: Ireland holds general election, with the ruling Fianna Fail swept from power in the worst result in its history. 
 
March 11: EU summit agrees to expand powers of EFSF to allow it  to buy debt in primary markets and tap its full 440 
billion euros in firepower. EU also reaches preliminary agreement to cut  the rates on emergency loans to Greece by 100 
basis points for first three years and extend maturities of the loans to 7.5 years. 
 
March 21: EU finance ministers decide on mechanisms for allowing the region’s permanent bailout mechanism, the 
ESM, lend 500 billion euros from 2013. The ESM will draw on 80 billion euros  of paid-in capital, enabling it to lend a 
full500 billion euros. 
 
March 23: Portugal’s Prime Minister Jose Socrates resigns after opposition rejects austerity package. 
 
March 25: European Union leaders cut the start-up capital for the future permanent euro emergency aid mechanism, 
the ESM, after German demands to make smaller upfront payments. 
 
April 6: Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates requests EU bailout, saying he “tried everything” to avoid seeking 
aid. 
 
April 15: Papandreou announces 76 billion euros of austerity measures, later increased to 78 billion euros, running 
through the end of 2015. The program pledged to raise 50 billion euros  from state asset sales and aims to cut the budget 
deficit to 1 percent of GDP in 2015. 
 
April 17: True Finns, who oppose euro bailouts, win 19 percent of the vote in Finnish elections. 
 
May 6: Finance ministers from Spain, France, Germany and Italy hold unannounced meeting in Luxembourg that 
prompt press reports  that Greece will leave the euro. Trichet walks out, refusing to  attend any meeting that discusses 
Greek haircuts. Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, who chairs finance ministers’ meetings, says 
possible further aid for Greece was  discussed. 
 
May 9: S&P cuts Greece two levels to B from BB-, threatens further cuts. 
 
May 11: German Chancellor Angela Merkel signals that she will support Mario Draghi’s candidacy to succeed Trichet 
as president of ECB. 
 
May 13: EU published new debt and deficit forecasts and predicts  that Ireland, Portugal, Greece will all to have debt of 
more than their total GDP in 2011. 
 
May 16: Portugal’s 78 billion-euro bailout approved by finance ministers. ECB’s Executive Board member Juergen 
Stark says restructuring would be “catastrophe” and wipe out Greek banks. Bini Smaghi says no difference between 
soft-hard restructuring. 
 
May 17: European finance ministers for the first time float the idea of talks with bondholders to extend Greece’s debt-
repayment schedule. 
 
May 18: IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss -Kahn resigns after being charged with attempting to rape a New 
York hotel maid. The case is thrown out three months later by a Manhattan  judge. 
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May 20: ECB’s governing council member and Bundesbank President  Jens Weidmann says central bank won’t take 
Greek bonds as collateral if maturities extended. 
 
May 22: Spain’s ruling Socialists suffer worst local election  defeat in 30 years. 
 
May 24: Greece announces details on additional 6 billion euros  of 2011 budget cuts, plan to speed asset sales. ECB 
governing council member Christian Noyer says Greek restructuring would be ‘horror story.’ 
 
May 27: Greek Cabinet passes another 6 billion euros in austerity measures and gave some details on planned assets  
sales. 
 
June 5: Social Democratic and People’s Party win majority in  Portuguese election, routing Socrates’ Socialists. 
 
June 7: EU Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn says June may be the “beginning of the end” of the crisis. 
 
June 13: S&P Cuts Greece to CCC, the lowest rating for any country it reviews in the world. 
 
June 15: Papandreou announces Cabinet reshuffle and confidence vote. 
 
June 17: Papandreou appoints Defense Minister Evangelos  Venizelos to replace Papaconstantinou as finance minister. 
 
June 22: Papandreou survives confidence vote in his government. 
 
June 24:  Draghi appointed to succeed Trichet as president of the ECB. 
 
June 28: French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde is named the first female head of the IMF with a mandate starting 
July 5. 
 
June 30: Greek lawmakers approve the 78 billion-euro austerity plan after two votes in two days marred by violent 
protests outside parliament. Berlusconi’s Cabinet approves 47 billion  euros in deficit-cutting measures to try to balance 
the budget by 2014 and protect Italy from the fallout of Europe’s debt  crisis. 
 
July 5: Moody’s cuts Portugal to junk. 
 
July 12: Moody’s cuts Ireland to junk. 
 
July 21: EU summit passes second bailout package for Greece and agrees to expand the powers of the EFSF. Bankers 
agree to take losses of 21 percent on the net present value of their Greek bond holdings. 
 
July 29: Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero sets Nov. 20 as date for early elections that polls show 
he will lose. Moody’s places Spain’s rating on review for a downgrade. 
 
Aug. 2: Spain’s 10-year bond reached euro-era record 6.46 percent. 
 
Aug. 4: The ECB votes to resume its bond-buying program, buys Portuguese and Irish debt. 
 
Aug. 5: ECB sends secret letter to Italy asking for more austerity measures and a plan to balance budget in 2013 rather 
than 2014. Berlusconi announces he will seek a balanced budget amendment and pledges more austerity Italian yields 
rise above Spanish yields for first time since May 2010. 
 
Aug. 7: After emergency conference call, ECB signals it will begin buying Italian and Spanish bonds in secondary 
markets as part of its Securities Markets Program. The next day Spain’s 10-year yield falls 88 basis points to 5.16 
percent, Italy’s drops  80 basis points to 5.23 percent. 
 
Aug. 12: Italy’s Cabinet approves by decree a 45.5 billion euro  austerity package to balance the budget in 2013 that 
helped secure ECB support for the country’s bonds. France, Spain, Italy  and Belgium impose bans on short-selling after 
shares in European banks, including Societe Generale SA, hit their lowest  level since Lehman’s collapse. 
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Aug. 16: Finland and Greece strike agreement on collateral to guarantee bailout contributions. The agreement was 
opposed by other euro members such as Austria and the Netherlands and had  to be re-negotiated. 
 
Aug. 19: Spain’s Cabinet passes another 5 billion euros of savings and cuts VAT on new home purchases. 
 
Aug. 29: Berlusconi bows to pressure from his allies to overhaul the August austerity package and drop a tax surcharge 
on Italians earning more than 90,000 euros a year. 
 
Aug. 31: Portugal raises capital gains taxes and increases  levies on corporate profit and high earners. 
 
Sept. 2: Inspectors from the European Union, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund suspend 
Greece’s fifth review after finding delays in the implementation of the medium term fiscal plan and structural economic 
reforms. Spain adds budget-discipline amendment to constitution, the second change in its 30-year history. 
 
Sept. 6: Italian unions hold general strike. 
 
Sept. 9: Juergen Stark resigns from ECB after opposing the bank’s bond purchases. 
 
Sept. 11: Papandreou approves new emergency measures to plug a gap in the budget for 2011. 
 
Sept. 14: Italian parliament gives final approval in a confidence vote to a 54 billion-euro austerity package to 
balance the budget in 2013. 
 
Sept. 15: ECB offers banks unlimited dollar loans for three months as worsening debt crisis sparks concern some 
institutions struggling to access U.S. currency. 
 
Sept. 16: Spain brings back wealth tax scrapped in 2008. 
 
Sept. 17: U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner urges  European officials to deal with the crisis and avoid 
“catastrophic risks” after flying to a meeting of European  Union finance chiefs in Poland. 
 
Sept. 19: Standard & Poor’s cuts Italy’s credit rating for the first time in almost five years, downgrading it to A from 
A+. 
 
Sept 30: Spanish bank bailout fund takes over three more savings  banks, valuing them between zero and 12 percent of 
book value and saying the overhaul of the financial industry is complete. Portugal revises up 2010 budget deficit to 9.8 
percent. 
 
Sept. 22: Italian Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti skips a parliamentary vote on whether to permit the arrest of his 
long- time aid Marco Milanese, straining relations with Berlusconi and key coalition allies. 
 
Oct. 2:  Greece’s government approves the draft budget for 2012 which targets a budget deficit of 8.5 percent of gross 
domestic product and announces it will miss revised deficit target for 2011. 
 
Oct. 3-4: EU finance ministers work out a revamped deal on collateral for Greek loans that satisfies Finnish demands 
and those of other euro-region governments opposed to abilateral deal for Finland. Leaders also hint that private 
investors may have to accept a bigger haircut on their Greek bonds than what was included in a July 21 agreement. 
 
Oct. 4: Moody’s cuts Italy for the first time in almost two  decades, lowering the rating to A2 from Aa2. 
 
Oct. 6: Spain says banking industry rather than the taxpayer will absorb losses incurred from bank bailouts. 
 
Oct. 7: Fitch cuts Spain to AA- and Italy to A+ 
 
Oct. 10: Dexia SA, Belgium’s biggest lender, becomes the biggest bank to succumb to the debt crisis. The bank is 
broken up, with Belgium taking control of its local consumer lending unit and France taking control of the municipal 
funding unit. 
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Oct. 11: Troika releases statement on fifth review of Greek economy and suggests the sixth tranche of the bailout 
payments worth 8 billion-euro be paid. 
 
Oct. 14: Berlusconi survives a confidence in vote in parliament that he was forced to call to prove he still had a working 
majority after losing a routine vote earlier in the week. 
 
Oct. 18: French bonds yield 112 basis points more than German equivalents. 
 
Oct. 19: Merkel, Sarkozy and other leaders meet for ad hoc emergency talks at Trichet’s retirement party at the Old 
Opera House in Frankfurt. 
 
Oct. 21: Papandreou wins parliamentary approval of latest austerity bill, which includes wage and pensions cuts and 
plans to lay-off 30,000 state workers. His majority falls by one lawmaker to 153 after he expels Louka Katseli for 
voting against one of the articles. EU, ECB, IMF issue draft sustainability report on Greece which said debt dynamics 
remain “worrying.” 
 
Oct. 23: European leaders say a summit on the euro crisis won’t produce decisions and set another meeting for Oct. 26. 
Greek 10- year yields trade at 25 percent. Merkel and Sarkozy smile at a news conference when asked whether 
Berlusconi can fix Italy’s  finances. 
 
Oct. 26-27: EU leaders hold 14th crisis summit in 21 months. After more than 10 hours of talks, leaders agreed to 
leverage the EU’s temporary bailout fund to boost its firepower to 1trillion euros, force private investors to accept a 50 
percent haircut on Greek bonds, push European banks to raise 106 billion euros in new capital, and extend a new aid 
package worth 130 billion euros for Greece. 
 
Oct. 31: Papandreou stuns EU politicians and Greek lawmakers by calling a referendum on the second bailout 
agreement. MF Global Holdings Inc. declares bankruptcy after bets on sovereign debt backfire. 
 
Nov. 1: Stocks and bonds plunged worldwide on concern an unsuccessful referendum will push Greece into a 
disorderly default. The yield on Greece’s two-year bond rises to a record 84.7 percent. Draghi succeeds Trichet as ECB 
president. 
 
Nov. 2: European leaders cut off aid payments to Greece and say Greece must decide soon whether it wants to stay in 
the euro. The ultimatum is at odds with the Maastricht Treaty’s assertion  that monetary union is “irrevocable.” 
 
Nov. 3: Papandreou backs down on euro referendum. Draghi’s ECB unexpectedly cuts interest rates to 1.25 percent at 
his first meeting. 
 
Nov. 4: G-20 meeting in the French city of Cannes fail to agree on providing more resources  to the IMF which could 
then lend to Europe’s bailout facility. 
 
Nov. 6: Papandreou agrees to step aside to make way for a government of national unity. 
 
Nov. 8: Berlusconi offers to resign as soon as Parliament approves austerity measures pledged to European partners, 
after defections from his ruling party left him without a majority and bond yields surged to euro-era records. 
 
Nov. 9: Italy’s 10-year bond yields 7 percent for the first time in the euro-era. 
 
Nov. 11: Lucas Papademos, a former ECB vice president is sworn in as prime minister of a Greek unity government. 
 
Nov. 12: Berlusconi resigns after Italian lawmakers pass debt-reduction measures. Former European Commissioner 
Mario Monti prepares to lead a technical government charged with implementing the austerity measures. 
 
Nov. 20: People’s Party leader Mariano Rajoy wins the biggest  parliamentary majority in a Spanish election in more 
than a quarter century. 
 
Nov. 28: U.S. President Barack Obama says after meeting with European officials that resolving the crisis is of “huge 
importance” to the U.S. 
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Nov. 30: Six central banks led by the Federal Reserve act to make it cheaper for banks to borrow dollars in 
emergencies. 
 
Dec. 1: Draghi calls for a “new fiscal compact” and signals  the ECB could do more to fight the debt crisis in return. 
 
Dec. 4: Monti’s Cabinet approves 30 billion euros in additional emergency economic measures for Italy. 
 
Dec. 5: S&P puts Germany, France and 13 other euro-area nations on review for a downgrade. 
 
Dec. 8: The ECB cuts its benchmark rate back to a record low of 1 percent and offers banks unlimited cash for three 
years. It also eases collateral rules. 
 
Dec. 9: Leaders complete all-night talks in Brussels on a “fiscal compact,” sparking a split with the U.K. Euro 
governments add 200 billion euros to their crisis -fighting warchest, tighten rules to curb future debts and speed the start  
of a 500 billion-euro rescue fund to next year. Draghi welcomes  the decisions, without signaling any willingness to step 
up bond purchases. 
 
Greek 10-year bond yield at 32 percent. 
Italian 10-year bond yield at 6.47 percent. 
Spanish 10-year bond yield at 5.77 percent. 
German 10-year bond yield at 2.07 percent 
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